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FOOTPRINTS IN THE SHIFTING SANDS OF THE ISLE OF 
PALMS: A PRACTICAL ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY 
TAKINGS CASES 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari during its 1991 term to 
review three decisions that riveted the attention of the land use bar.' 
Practitioners hoped that decisions in these cases would yield reliable 
definitions as to when a public regulation constitutes a taking of pri- 
vate property compensable under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution. The stakes were high as evidenced by more than fifty 
amicus curiae briefs filed in the most closely watched of the three 
cases: Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun~i l .~  Groups as diverse as 
the National Cattlemen's Association, the Property Rights Preserva- 
tion Association, and the Pacific Legal Foundation urged the Court to 
decide for the property owner.3 Entities ranging from the Municipal 
B.A. University of Nebraska 1963; J.D. University of Michigan 1966. Mr. Nolon is the 
Charles A. Fmeauff Research Professor at Pace Law School in White Plains, New York, where 
he teaches and writes in the areas of land use, property, environmental regulation, and real estate 
transactions and finance. He has co-authored with Duo Dickinson Common WalIs/Private 
Homes: Multiresidential Design (1990), sewed on BNA's editorial board for the Housing and 
Development Reporter, and advises in rural and urban developments in Latin America. 
1. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991) (granting certiorari), 
and rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992); PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 112 S. Ct. 414 (1991) 
(granting certiorari), and cert. dismissed, 1 12 S. Ct. 1 15 1 (1992); Yee v. City of Escondido, 1 12 S. 
Ct. 294 (1991) (granting certiorari), and aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992). 
2. 1 I2 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
3. See Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae & Brief Amici Curiae of Mountain 
States Legal Found. & the Nat'l Cattlemen's Ass'n in Support of Petitioner at 6, Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (No. 91-453); Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific 
Legal Found. in Support of Petitioner David H. Lucas at 4-6, id.; Washington Legal Found., 
Allied Educational Found., Property Rights Preservation, Inc., & Fairness to Land Owners Com- 
mittee as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6-7, id; 
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Art Society of New York, the Sierra Club, and the American Planning 
Association argued in favor of the State of South C a r ~ l i n a . ~  
The first case disposed of was PFZ Properties v. Rodriguez.' It pre- 
sented a familiar set of facts: the developer was unable to obtain a 
construction permit for a proposed development after a long and tor- 
turous review process involving many delays. In March of 1992, the 
Court simply ruled that certiorari was granted impr~vidently,~ slaking 
none of the thirst for definitive guidelines caused by a drought of 
clearly reasoned opinions in recent years. 
The summary treatment of PFZ Properties heightened interest in 
Yee v. City of Escondido,' in which a property owner complained that 
a California mobile home rent control scheme constituted a regulatory 
taking. In a decision by Justice O'Connor rendered in April, 1992, the 
Court confined its opinion to the narrow question of whether the regu- 
lation authorized a "physical occupation" of the plaintiff's p r ~ p e r t y . ~  
The Court found no such invasion and upheld the state court's deci- 
sion in favor of the rent control ordinance. The decision did not ad- 
dress broader regulatory takings issues because the Yees did not 
include such claims in their appeaLg 
It was not until the last day of the term, June 29, 1992, that the 
Court decided Lucas. By that time, interest could not have been 
greater. At issue was the validity of a regulation that prohibited all 
permanent development of the plaintiff's two beachfront lots. The 
South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the regulation by a 3-2 margin 
because it prevented a "great public harm."I0 The U.S. Supreme Court 
reversed that determination and remanded the case to determine 
whether South Carolina's common law of nuisance could prohibit the 
construction of single-family housing on the lots." The fractured 
4. See generally Brief of the Municipal Art Society of New York, Inc., Amicus Curiae, in 
Support of Affirmance, id.; Brief Amici Curiae of Sierra Club, the Humane Society of the United 
States, and the American Institute of Biological Sciences in Support of Respondent, id.; Brief for 
American Planning Association and Tahoe Regional Planning Agency as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Respondent, id. 
5. PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 414 
(1991), cert. dismhed, 112 S. Ct. 1151 (1992). PFZ Properties claimed that the reviewing agen- 
cy's delay and ultimate denial of their project approval constituted a violation of its equal protec- 
tion and procedural and substantive due process rights. Id. at 30. Its action was not based on the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 30 n.2. 
6. PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez. I I2 S. Ct. 1 IS1 (1992) (dismissing certiorari). 
7. 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992). aff'g 274 Cal. Rptr. 551 (Ct. App. 1990). 
8. Id. at 1528. 
9. Id. at 1532-34. 
10. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal.Counci1, 404 s.E.21 895, 898 (S.C. 1991). rev'd, 
112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
I I .  Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 112 S. Ct. 2886,2901-02 (1992). 
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Court delivered an opinion in which five justices formed a majority,12 
one concurred,I3 another submitted a separate "~tatement ,"~~ and two 
vigorously dissented.Is A close examination of the divided opinion re- 
veals a faint trail to follow in exploring regulatory takings jurispru- 
dence; the decision left shallow footprints in the shifting coastal sands 
of South Carolina where the contested regulation prevented the devel- 
opment of the plaintiffs land. 
A. The Takings Enigma 
The federal Constitution uses a semicolon to separate its Due Proc- 
ess and Takings Clauses: "nor shall any person be . . . deprived of . . . 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation."I6 Both provisions 
protect property rights. The first guards against deprivations of prop- 
erty without due process. The second prohibits the taking of property 
by the sovereign for other than a public purpose and only if just com- 
pensation is paid. 
Historically, the validity of land use regulations protecting the public 
health, safety, morals, or general welfare is reviewed under the sepa- 
rate Due Process Clause. Courts uphold such regulations if the regula- 
tory objective is legitimate and properly promoted by the regulation. If 
the regulation violates due process requirements, courts will enjoin its 
enforcement, thereby relieving the property owner of its effect. Moreo- 
ver, the owner may bring an action for consequential damages." 
The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause allows the government to sin- 
gle out individual properties or property interests and to appropriate 
them for a valid public purpose. The clause requires only that the 
owner receive just compensation: the full value of the interest appro- 
priated. In general, the Takings Clause requires the courts to be vigi- 
lant that government actions and enterprises do not acquire such 
interests, directly or indirectly, without payment of just compensation. 
12. Id. at 2887 ( S d i a ,  J., writing for Court, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, O'Con- 
nor, and Thomas, J.J.). 
13. Id. at 2902 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
14. Id. at 2925 (statement of Souter, J.). 
15. Id. at 2904 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 2917 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
16.' U.S. CONST. amend. V. These standards are equally applicable to the regulations of fed- 
eral, state, and local agencies. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R.- 
v. City of Chicago, 166 U S .  226, 241 (1897) (applying the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment to the states and their instrumentalities). 
17. See42 U.S.C. 5 1983 (1988) ("Every person who, under color of any statute . . . subjects 
. . . any citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured."). 
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It is axiomatic that a land use regulation may not "take" property if 
it does not further a public purpose. A reviewing court may invalidate 
a regulation that does not advance a proper interest because it is repug- 
nant to due process principles. To  award just compensation for prop- 
erty interests taken by such a regulation would allow what the Fifth 
Amendment prohibits: the taking of property for other than a public 
purpose. So, the notion that a regulation may be a Fifth Amendment 
taking-a regulatory taking-is enigmatic.'* 
B. Uncertainty in the Case Law 
Seeds of confusion in distinguishing a proper regulation from a tak- 
ing were first sown in 1922, when Justice Holmes stated "while prop- 
erty may be regulated to  a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it 
will be recognized as a taking."I9 For a half century thereafter, the 
Court entertained no occasion to  explain how one determines when a 
regulation goes too far. Beginning in 197820 and culminating in a 1987 
trilogy of cases,2' the Court struggled with this issue, piercing little of 
its enigmatic nature.22 Indeed, some opinions created additional confu- 
sion by indicating that just compensation may be awarded when a reg- 
ulation eliminates all  land value, if only t e m p ~ r a r i l y . ~ ~  Some 
commentators suggested that the Court applied heightened scrutiny to 
certain types of regulatory takings cases, an uncharacteristic attitude.24 
The cases decided by the 1991 term of the U.S. Supreme Court did 
little to eliminate the disarray of judicial tests for regulatory takings.25 
18. See Jerold S. Kayden, Judges As Planners: Limited or General Partners? in ZONING AND 
THE AMERICAN DREAM: PROMISES TILL TO KEEP 235-37 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden 
eds.. 1989). The issue of how enigmatic is the concept of a "regulatory taking," in practice. 
provides an interesting topic for additional research. As future cases are decided, it will be inter- 
esting to inquire whether just compensation awards are limited primarily to  those instances where 
all, or nearly all, value of the land has been denied its owner. If so, the enigma will prove to be 
mostly theoretical. 
19. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922). 
20. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
21. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles. 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal 
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
22. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 866 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Even the wisest lawyers would 
have to acknowledge great uncertainty about the scope of this Court's takings jurisprudence."). 
23. First English, 482 U.S. at 317-18; cj. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. 
County of Los Angeles. 258 Cal. Rptr. 893, 904-05 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding on remand that the 
regulation did not constitute a taking because it substantially advanced the state's interest in pub- 
lic safety). 
24. See, e.g.. Craig A. Peterson. Land Use Regulatory "Takings" Revisited: The New Su- 
preme Court Approaches. 39 HASTINGS L.J. 335. 352 (1988) (characterizing NoNan as applying 
"stricter judicial scrutiny in land use regulatory takings cases"). 
25. See Ruddick C. Lawrence, Bright Lines in the Big City: Seawall. Tenant Succession 
Heinonline 8 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 4 19921993 
1 9921 REGULA TOR Y TAKINGS 5 
The language of the cases appeared hopelessly mired in an unnatural 
mix of traditional due process rules and the unique takings considera- 
tions of the Just Compensation Clause. Judges and scholars have 
searched valiantly for unifying principles, formal guidelines, definitive 
allocations of burdens of proof, fixed standards of judicial deference, 
precise factors for balancing private and public interests, distinctions 
between regulations that prevent harm and those that promote public 
benefits, clear exceptions to the fixed rules being sought, and a hierar- 
chy of interests to use in a balancing process that is yet undefined." 
Despite the energy devoted to these efforts, the collected decisions of 
our federal and state courts provide few fixed rules to guide the practi- 
tioner, judge, law professor, property owner, or regulator. These mat- 
ters are litigated so vigorously today that the forces arrayed against 
land use regulations have been classified as a m~vernent.~' 
C. Purpose of Article 
This article endeavors to provide a practical perspective on, and to 
derive some practical lessons from, the judicial decisions in the regula- 
tory takings field. Part I1 examines and evaluates the Lucas case and 
its categorical test for reviewing regulations that constitute !'total tak- 
ings:" where no productive use of land is left by the regulation. The 
discussion contrasts Lucas to the standardless inquiry prescribed for 
the vast majority of cases where the regulation leaves the owner some 
value. Part I11 describes the operating technique of federal and state 
judges in deciding regulatory takings cases and concludes that the re- 
sults in cases can be understood, if not predicted, through an analysis 
of the factual context of each case. 
Rights. and the Jurkprudence of Takings, 91 COLUM. L.  REV. 609, 609 (1991) ("The jurispru- 
dence of takings has been variously described as 'untidy and confused,' 'somewhat illogical.' 'a 
muddle,' 'a crazyquilt pattern,' 'open-ended and standardless,' 'chaotic,' 'mystifying,' and 'inco- 
herent."'). 
26. See, e.g., Lynn Ackerman, Searching for a Standard for Regulatory Takings Based on 
Investment-Backed Expectations: A Survey of State Court Deckions in the Vested Rights and 
Zoning EFtoppel Areas, 36 EMORY L.J. 1219 (1987); Jerry L. Anderson, Takings and Expecta- 
tions: Toward A "Broader Virion " of Property Rights. 37 KAN. L. REV. 529 (1989); Raymond R. 
Coletta, Reciprocity of Advantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward a New Theory of Takings 
Jurkptudence. 40 AM. U. L. REV. 297 (1990); John J. Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: 
A Deckional Model for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465 (1983); Douglas W. Kmiec, The 
Original Understanding of the Taking Clause is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLW. L. REV. 
1630 (1988); Susan J .  Krueger, Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis: ~oward  Rede- 
fining Takings Law, 64 N.Y .U. L. REV. 877 (1989); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In 
Search of Underlying Principles Part 11-Takings As Intentional Deprivations of Property With- 
out Moral Justification. 78 CAL. L. REV. 53 (1990). 
27. Kirstin Downey, A Conservative Supreme Court Addrwes Property Rights, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 16, 1992, at HI (referring to "an increasingly militant property-rights movement"). 
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Part IV argues that all regulatory taking controversies fit into one of 
four factual contexts. It discusses cases in each of these four categories 
and explains how and why courts tend to reach understandable results 
using predictable operating techniques in each category. Part V derives 
guidelines from these insights to help regulators draft regulations that 
will withstand judicial scrutiny and identify those that will not. The 
conclusion argues that most regulations will not be invalidated, but 
that regulators should infuse maximum fairness into their regulatory 
regimes for a variety of persuasive reasons. 
The Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal CounciP8 
applied a categorical test for reviewing "total takings." A discussion 
of the opinion provides an opportunity to examine the larger issue of 
judicial deference to the judgments of regulators and to pinpoint where 
a more exacting standard of review is used by the Court. The Lucas 
opinion should be of limited importance, if confined to similar fact 
patterns. It raises, however, a host of unresolved issues that merit a 
thorough examination of its facts and holding. 
A. The Lucas Controversy 
David Lucas purchased two beachfront lots in 1986 for $975,000.29 
In 1988, the State of South Carolina passed the Beachfront Manage- 
ment Act30 which, by virtue of a setback provision, prohibited the de- 
velopment of all permanent habitable structures on Lucas' pr~perty.~ '  
Lucas claimed that he had purchased the lots to build single-family 
housing, in accordance with applicable zoning, and that he had en- 
gaged an architect to draw plans for two houses: one for sale, the other 
for the use of his family.j2 
At first blush, this appeared to be a classic case of an unsuspecting 
purchaser having his entire investment destroyed by a subsequent regu- 
lation. Since 1979, however, Lucas had been a contractor and realtor 
in the development of the barrier island known as the Isle of Palms. 
He purchased two lots there with apparent knowledge of the fragile 
and changing state of affairs on the barrier island. Studies existed 
28. I12 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
29. Id. at 2889. 
30. See S.C. CODE ANN. 55 48-39-250 to -360 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991). 
31. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889-90. 
32. Id. at 2889. 
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showing vast fluctuations of the shoreline and considerable erosion of 
the area in the vicinity of the plaintiff's property. During half the time 
since 1949, all or part of the property was part of the beach or flooded 
daily by tide ~a te r s .3~  Lucas offered studies claiming that, over a 1500 
year period, the Isle of Palms was accreting, moving seaward, except 
for a few episodes of erosion." 
The State of South Carolina argued that, due to the unstable nature 
of the barrier island, there was a high risk that structures and their 
occupants would be vulnerable to adverse weather  condition^.'^ As 
borne out by Hurricane Hugo, extreme winds break up structures on 
barrier island beaches and carry them like projectiles onto adjacent ar- 
e a ~ . ' ~  Severe storms can break septic tanks and sewer lines, leading to 
contamination of coastal waters. The cost to the public for cleanup 
and relief is ~onsiderable.~' 
The trial court found that the restrictions constituted a regulatory 
taking and awarded Lucas $1,232,387.50 as just c~mpensat ion.~~ The
South Carolina Supreme Court reversed this determinati~n.'~ Lucas 
conceded at trial that the Beachfront Management Act was a proper 
and valid effort to preserve South Carolina's beaches, an extremely 
valuable resource. His position was simply that since the regulation de- 
nied him all economically viable use of his property, the state must 
compensate him. This, he claimed, was so even if the regulation pre- 
vented serious public harm.40 
I .  The Deferential Role of Reviewing Courts 
The South Carolina Supreme Court paid great deference to the de- 
terminations of the state legislature, noting that it was bound by the 
"uncontested legislative  finding^."^' The court accepted the legislative 
determination that the prevention of new construction near the beach 
was necessary to prevent a "great public harm."42 The acquiescence of 
33. Record at 84. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991) (No. 
23,342), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
34. Id. at 26. 
35. Id. at 77-87. 
36. Natasha Zalkin, Shifting Sands and Shifring Doctrines: The Supreme Court's [Changing] 
Takings Doctrine Through [sic] and South Carolina's Coastal Zone Statute, 79 CAL. L. REV. 205. 
207, 212-16 (1991). 
37. Id. 
38. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,2890 (1992). 
39. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991). rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 
2886 (1992). . . 
40. Id. at 898. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
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the South Carolina court is consistent with the historic role of the 
courts in the land use area. 
Since the seminal case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty C O . , ~ ~  
in which the U.S. Supreme Court first upheld zoning, the judiciary has 
been highly deferential to legislative determinations of the need to reg- 
ulate land use in the public interest. The Court struck its deferential 
posture in Euclid with this sentence: "If the validity of the legislative 
classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative 
judgment must be allowed to control."" 
Where the prevention of great public harm has been the aim of regu- 
lations in the past, the U.S. Supreme Court similarly has deferred to 
legislative judgments. As recently as 1987, in Keystone Bituminous 
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedicti~,~~ the Court wrote: " [Tlhe Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania has acted to arrest what it perceives to be a significant 
threat to the common welfare."46 On the strength of findings con- 
tained in the Pennsylvania act itself, the Court upheld a regulation that 
prevented the plaintiffs from mining a part of their subsurface estate, 
rejecting their claim that this deprivation of property amounted to a 
regulatory taking.47 The South Carolina Supreme Court majority cited 
Keystone for the proposition that "all property in this country is held 
under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be 
injurious to  the cornm~ni ty ."~~ The state court stood in the main- 
stream of regulatory takings jurisprudence by deferring to a legislative 
determination of what uses of property are injurious. 
2. More Demanding Judicial Review I n  Rare Cases 
No U.S. Supreme Court decision has upheld a land use regulation 
that left the property owner with no productive use of the affected 
property. In theory, such a ruling is possible. If all productive uses of a 
property are sufficiently injurious to the community, the right of pro- 
ductive use arguably is not among the rights held by the property 
43. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
44. Id. at  388; see also Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927) ("City councils . . . are 
better qualified than the courts" to make these determinations); Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 
274 U.S. 325 (1927) ("[IJt is impossible for us to say that [this zoning decision] was clearly arbi- 
trary and unreasonable."); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (holding that chal- 
lenger overcame presumption of validity by proving affirmatively that the regulation bore no 
relation to advancing a public interest). 
45. 480 U.S. 470 (1987). ' . . 
46. Id. at 485, . . 
47. Id. at'501-02. 
48. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 901 (S.C. 1991) (citing Key- 
stone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,491-92 (1987)), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2886 
(1992). The phrase seems to have originated in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,665 (1887). 
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owner. In practice, however, most regulations leave some beneficial 
use and such a case seldom arises to test the theory. Lucas is the rare 
exception. 
In Lucas, the trial court found that the plaintiff was denied all eco- 
nomic use of his land.49 Resting on that conclusion, Justice Scalia, 
writing for the majority, noted that where all economic use is taken, 
the public interest advanced by the legislature in support of the regula- 
tion cannot, in itself, justify the regulation.'O In other words, deference 
to the legislative finding does not conclude the inquiry. In these cases, 
where the plaintiff proves that there is no economic use of the prop- 
erty, Scalia held that "no matter how weighty the public purpose be- 
hind [the regulation], we have required cornpensati~n."~' 
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that the majority's approach 
"alters the long-settled rules of Ljudicial] review" and places the "bur- 
den of showing the regulation is not a taking" on the state.52 Scalia 
conceded that the Court never stated the justification for the rule he 
followed in L ~ c a s . ' ~  He explained his approach in the following man- 
ner: 
1. In the "extraordinary circumstance when no productive 
or economically beneficial use of land is permitted, it is less 
realistic to indulge our usual assumption that the legislature is 
simply 'adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life."'54 
Implicitly, the burden on the individual owner in such a case is 
simply too great, consequently violating historical standards of 
fairness. 
2. In such cases, there is a "heightened risk that private 
property is being pressed into some form of public service 
under the guise of mitigating serious public harm."55 Eminent 
domain law allows the acquisition of private lands of the type 
owned by Lucas for a variety of public purposes. Scalia seemed 
to "sense" that the regulation accomplished a public enterprise 
49. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2908 (1992) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) ("The Court creates its new taking jurisprudence based on the trial court's finding that 
the property had lost all economic value. This finding is almost certainly erroneous."). 
50. See id. at 2898 n.12. Scalia's conclusion echoes Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Key- 
stone: "[O]ur cases have never applied the nuisance exception to allow complete extinction of the 
value of a parcel of property." Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470. 
513 (1987) (Rehnquist, C..J., dissenting). 
51. Lucas, l t2S .Ct .a t2893 .  
52. Id. at 2h9 .  
53. Id. at2894. 
54. Id. (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). 
55. Id. at 2895. 
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outside the strictures of the eminent domain law, thus requiring 
compensation. One assumes this sense is stimulated only in 
those cases where the property owner is left with nothing. 
3. The majority saw only one instance in which a regulation 
that takes "all economically beneficial use of land" could be 
upheld: where the limitation placed on the property by the 
regulation inheres in the title itself.% If, under the nuisance law 
of the state, the use restriction could be imposed by adjacent 
landowners as a private nuisance or by the state under its 
power to abate public nuisances, then the regulation will stand. 
Scalia borrowed from the Restatement (Second) of Tort$' to 
illustrate the factors figuring into such an analysis. They 
include: the degree of harm involved in the unregulated use of 
the affected property, the alternative means available to avoid 
that harm, the social value of that use, and the suitability of 
that use in the locality. In Scalia's opinion, "[ilt seems unlikely 
that [such] common-law principles would have prevented the 
erection of any habitable or productive improvements" on 
Lucas' land.5s 
56. Id. at 2899. 
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS $8 826-827 (1979). 
58. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901. It is interesting that, in the absence of federally subsidized 
flood insurance or a state requirement that insurance companies doing business in South Carolina 
participate in shared-risk insurance pools, very little development could occur on beachfront lots 
in high-erosion and high-risk areas. Private construction loans and permanent mortgages for de- 
velopment will not be issued by lenders in the Isle of Palms market area unless evidence of prop- 
erty insurance is provided as part of an application for such financing. John R. Nolon, Survey of 
Lending & Insurance Practices on the Isle of Palms (Sept. 11. 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on  
file with the Journal of Land Use & Environmental Law). Conventional property insurance cover- 
age is not provided by private insurance companies for development on the Isle of Palms within 
1000 feet of the beachfront. Id. This includes the setback area established by the Beachfront 
Management Act: the property restriction contested in Lucm. A proposal to  eliminate federal 
flood insurance for new construction in high erosion areas passed the House of Representatives in 
May, 1991, by a vote of 388 to 16, with the unanimous approval of South Carolina's representa- 
tives. See 137 CONG. REC. H2633, H2653 (daily ed. May 1, 1991) (passing H.R. 1236, 102d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)). A similar proposal is pending before the Senate. See S. 1650, 102d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Presumably, the state legislature could act to limit its insurance pooling 
requirements, see S.C. CODE ANN. $ 38-35-370 (Law. Coop.  1985), leaving beachfront developers 
in high-risk areas no method of obtaining casualty insurance, and therefore no ability to qualify 
for construction or mortgage financing. 
These facts raise an  interesting question of whether the limitations on development imposed by 
the challenged regulation in Lucas "inhere in the title [of the property] itself." Lucm, 112 S. Ct. 
at 2900, due to local industry practices, shaped by prevailing legal considerations in the unregu- 
lated private market. A corollary question is whether the elimination of these government-spon- 
sored insurance programs would constitute a "newly legislated" limitation on development of the 
type Scalia says legislatures may not pass without compensation, if their effect is to deny all 
productive use of land. Id. Simply stating these queries raises obvious questions about the wisdom 
of judicial usurpation of legislative prerogatives in these complex and interrelated areas of society. 
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B. Summary of the Holding in Lucas 
The Court created an exception to the general rulesQ of takings law 
that requires deference to legislative determinations. That exception 
applies when all economically beneficial use of the land is prohibited. 
In such a case, courts owe little deference to legislative determinations. 
The only limitation to this exception occurs when, under common law 
principles, the use denied by the regulation can be abated as a nui- 
sance. Lucas swings the balance heavily from the legislative chamber to 
the bench in total takings cases. By reversing the historical standard of 
deference and defining nuisances through reference to case law, the 
Court left the legislature little, if any, ability to regulate in its discre- 
tion where the regulation denies all use.60 
59. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926); see also supra notes 4148 and 
accompanying text; United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.. 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) ("[Tlhe exis- 
tence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed."). 
60. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2914 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Troubled by "the Court's reliance 
on common-law principles of nuisance in its quest for a value-free taking jurisprudence," id., 
Blackmun states: "In determining what is a nuisance at common law, state courts make exactly 
the decision that the Court finds so troubling when made by the South Carolina General Assem- 
bly today: they determine whether the use is harmful." Id. 
There is considerable irony in this reliance on the common law of nuisance in Lucas. In 1970, 
New York's highest court held that litigation under nuisance doctrines was not competent to re- 
solve the broad geographical impacts of air pollution and similar matters. It wrote: 
A court should not try to do  this on its own as a by-product of private litigation and 
it seems manifest that the judicial establishment is neither equipped in the limited na- 
ture of any judgment it can pronounce nor prepared to  lay down and implement an 
effective policy for the elimination of air pollution. This is an area beyond the circum- 
ference of one private lawsuit. It is a direct responsibility for government and should 
not thus be undertaken as an incident to solving a dispute between property owners and 
a single cement plant-one of many-in the Hudson River valley. 
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.M 870, 871 (N.Y. 1970). The irony arises in comparing 
this language to  that of Justice Scalia in Lucas: 
Any limitation so severe [as a total taking] cannot be newly legislated or decreed (with- 
out compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that back- 
ground principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land 
ownership. A law or  decree with such an effect must, in other words, d o  no more than 
duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts-by adjacent landown- 
ers (or other uniquely affected persons) under the State's law of private nuisance, or by 
the State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public gen- 
erally, or otherwise. 
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900 (emphasis added). 
'Scalia defines nuisance exclusively by reference to  the case law. Under Boomer, the highest New 
- 
. . York'couit declared its incompetence, in the context of a private case, to  handle matters involving 
broad' geographical impacts such as air pollution and, one would suppose, coastal protection. 
There is a worrisome Catch-22 situation here, a gap in logic and strategy that protects the prop- 
erty owner from a total taking, leaving the communitarian interest in critical environmental pro- 
tection in the breach. 
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I. Application of the Lucas Holding 
Justice Blackmun began his dissent by saying "[tloday the Court 
launches a missile to kill a mouse."61 Blackmun's metaphor addressed 
a portion of the opinion where the majority conceded that cases where 
the state prohibits all economic use of real estate will arise "relatively 
rarely" or only in "extraordinary circ~mstances."~~ Noting this, Black- 
mun "question[ed] the Court's wisdom in issuing sweeping new rules 
to decide such a narrow case."63 Blackmun feared that "the Court's 
new policies will spread beyond the narrow confines of the present 
This fear is well founded.'j5 When in Nollan, for example, Justice 
Scalia used new language to define the extent to which the means cho- 
sen to accomplish a public purpose must actually further that purpose, 
speculation flourished as to whether this implied a stricter standard of 
judicial review and whether such a standard adheres to the narrow 
facts of the case, or whether it generally should be applied to regula- 
tory takings cases.66 Since then, federal and state appellate cases have 
answered these questions in a variety of ways.67 For example, in Sea- 
wall Associates v. City of New Y ~ r k , ~ ~  New York's highest court in- 
vented three separate types of per se takings categories based on 
Scalia's new language.69 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not identified discrete classes of regula- 
tory takings cases in which clear rules of judicial review apply. As a 
result, tests and standards developed in one context can bleed through 
to other types of cases. Does Lucas, for example, reverse Miller v. 
Schoene,'O where the Court sustained a regulation ordering the com- 
plete destruction of plaintiff's cedar trees to prevent the spread of in- 
festation to valuable apple trees on neighboring properties? In Miller, 
the Court did not "weigh with nicety the question whether the infected 
cedars constitute a nuisance according to the common law; or whether 
61. Lucm, 112 S. Ct. at 2904. 
62. See id. at 2894,2904. 
63. Id. at 2904. 
64. Id. The day after Lucm was decided, for example, five Massachusetts lawmakers filed a 
bill to repeal the State's Watershed Protection Act, citing Lucm as the reason. Repeal Sought for 
Watershed Act, BOSTON GLOBE, July 1 ,  1992, at 50. 
65. See infra notes 173-80. 
66. . Nollan v. Cdifornia Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 825 n.3 (1987); see Peterson, supra 
note 24. . 
67. See generally-Jerold S. Kayden. ~ o n d  Use Regulations, ~ationality, and Judicial Review: 
The RSVP in the Nollan Invitation (Part I), 23 URB. LAW. 301 (1991). 
68. 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N .Y .  1989). 
69. See discussion infra part IV.B.2. 
70. 276 U.S. 272,281 (1928). 
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they may be so declared by ~tatute."~' The Miller facts raise the specter 
of an imminent public peril, while Lucas involves an evolution of pub- 
lic understanding about the dangers of development on a barrier is- 
land. '* 
Further, it is by no means clear what Scalia meant when he referred 
to the denial of "all economically beneficial or productive use of 
land."73 In fact, throughout the opinion he used other phraseology in- 
cluding "economically viable use of . . . land,"74 "total deprivation of 
beneficial use, "75 " no productive or economically beneficial use,"76 
and "without economically beneficial or productive options for . . . 
use."77 What these various phrases mean depends as well on the prop- 
erty interest to which they are applied. Lucas lost the highest and best 
use of the property, but not his right of possession, right to exclude, 
right to alienate, or his right to enjoy his property in its undeveloped 
state. Do these rights have value? Are they part of the equation used to 
determine whether all "beneficial use" is taken? 
Finally, Scalia's additional language regarding the property interest 
involved in the takings analysis is bound to result in additional confu- 
sion. He commented that "uncertainty regarding the composition of 
the denominator in our 'deprivation' fraction has produced inconsis- 
tent pronouncements by the In fact, there has been very little 
disagreement in the cases, since almost all of them have held that it is 
the diminution in the market value of the total estate that is reviewed 
to measure the burden on the private owner. 
Scalia's comment will likely spur litigation in those highly unusual 
circumstances where state laws first create a discrete and unusual prop- 
erty estate, and then affect that estate through regulation. Affected 
owners may advance the argument that the value of that discrete estate 
71. Id. at 280. 
72. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2921 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). Stevens noted that, at one time. the Court had endorsed this view: 
[Tlhe supervision of the public health and the public morals is a governmental power, 
"continuing in its nature," and "to be dealt with as the special exigencies of the mo- 
ment may require;" . . . "for this purpose, the largest legislative discretion is allowed, 
and the discretion cannot be parted with any more than the power itself." 
Id. (quoting Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,669 (1887)). 
73. Id. at 2893; c/. id. at 2908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The trial court appeared to be- 
lieve that the [ L u w ]  property could be considered 'valueless' if it was not available for its most 
profitable use."). 
74. Id. at 2983 n.6 (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis. 480 U.S. 470. 
495 (1987)), 2984 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,260 (1980)). 
75. Id. at 2894. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 2894-95. 
78. Id. at 2894 n.7. 
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is the denominator used in measuring the degree of diminution effected 
by the reg~ la t ion .~~  Similarly, where state law affects a possessory es- 
tate, such as an easement to traverse, courts assess the impact on that 
estate i t ~ e l f . ~  Although this "uncertainty" has arisen in narrow cir- 
cumstances,. landowners are being counselled generally to learn "[hlow 
to fractionalize current property holdings to discourage regulation" 
and how to "define 'the parcel' or property unit to demonstrate depri- 
vation of all economically-feasible use."8i 
Presumably, the Lucas Court meant to limit its holding to the facts 
of the case, which are narrow indeed. But Scalia's words can only en- 
courage developers to challenge regulations that diminish the value of 
their lands. At the very least, the pace of litigation in this already liti- 
gious field will quicken as a result of the Supreme Court's decision. 
Moreover, the nondeferential test of Lucas may be nourished by the 
general confusion in this area and grow without great regard for the 
presumed intent of the Court that articulated it. In that respect, Black- 
mun's fears may be prophetic. 
2. Analysis of the Lucas Holding 
Despite these concerns, not much should happen as a result of 
L u ~ a s . ~ ~  The holding is properly confined to the facts of the case, 
79. Compare Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) with Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,497-502 (1987). 
80. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n. 483 U.S. 825, 831-37 (1987). 
8 1. NATIONAL REAI ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CENTER, HOW TO SUCCESSFULLY RESOLVE LAND 
USE & REAL ESTATE ISSUES IN THE WAKE OF L u c a  2 (1992) (advertising "tactical workshop" on 
overcoming regulations) (on file with the Journal of Land Use di Environmental Law). The prop- 
osition is dubious that a regulatory taking will be found where an owner purchases property and 
intentionally subdivides it, segments its title, or  otherwise manipulates it so that a portion of 
property is unusable under applicable land regulations. If the facts are known to a court, would it 
decide that the owner is "unduly singled out" by the regulation or that "essential fairness" is 
denied? That courts will seek such facts and question so-called "fractionalization" or "segmenta- 
tion" of property is apparent in the tests adopted by the Eleventh Circuit to determine whether a 
regulation has taken all or  substantially all value. These factors include "the history of develop- 
ment-what was built on the property and by whom? How was it subdivided and to whom was it 
sold? What plats were filed?"; and "what is the present nature and extent of the property?" 
Reahard v. Lee County, 968 F.2d 1131, 1136 (1 1th Cir. 1992). 
82. But see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2921-22 (1992) (Stev- 
ens, J., dissenting). In the area of statutory nuisance prevention, Stevens sees a considerable prob- 
lem: 
Under the Court's opinion today, however, if .a state should decide to prohibit the 
manufacture of asbestos, cigarettes, or concealable firearms, for example, it must be 
prepared to  pay for the adverse economic consequences of its decision. One must won- 
der if Government will be able to "go on" effectively if it must risk compensation "for 
every such change in the general law." 
Id. at 2921 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393.413 (1922)). 
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which the Court itself characterized as "relatively rare."83 In fact, 
there is already precedent for per se takings of this sort in cases like 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Gorp.," where a publicly 
imposed physical connection of a television cable was deemed a taking 
per se even though the space invaded was less than one and one half 
cubic feet.8s Although such cases do  not fall quite like Scalia's guillo- 
tine, the basic holding in Lucas does not represent a dramatic depar- 
ture, if confined to similar facts. 
Unfortunately, at the end of the term, the troubled field of regula- 
tory takings remained unsettled by PFZ Properties, Yee, and Lucas. 
Scalia did provide in Lucas an interesting review of the takings field. 
He affirmed that regulations do  not owe their validity to any claim 
that they prevent or eliminate noxious or harmful uses.86 He set to rest 
the much-debated harm/benefit analysis as an unhelpful means of sep- 
arating regulatory takings from "regulatory deprivations that do not 
require c~mpensation."~~ Instead, Scalia tells us, regulations are valid 
simply because they are "reasonably related to the implementation of a 
policy-not unlike historic preservation-expected to produce a wide- 
spread public benefit and applicable to all similarly situated prop- 
e r t ~ . " ~ ~  A "land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it 
'substantially advanceis] legitimate state  interest^."'^^ 
Scalia's review of takings jurisprudence may tend to blunt challenges 
to the legitimacy of certain regulatory programs, such as historic pres- 
ervation or viewshed protection. With that clarifying exception, Lucas 
does not settle this area of the law. One can expect more cases like 
Seawall that seek to expand on the per se takings category of ~ a s e s . ~  
Future areas of litigation include: the continuing debate over the mean- 
ing of Scalia's "essential nexus" test in Nollan; persistent confusion as 
to what constitutes the "property interest" affected by a regulation; 
attempts by land owners to stretch the meaning of "no productive or 
economically beneficial use" beyond the confines of the Lucas facts; 
experiments with property segmentation and property interest sever- 
83. Id. at 2894. 
84. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
85. Id.at421. 
86. Lucm, 112 S. Ct. at 2897; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 
U.S. 104, 134 (1978) (stating that valid exercises of the police power do not depend on "any 
supposed 'noxious' quality of the prohibited uses, but rather on the ground that the restrictions 
were reasonably related to the implementation of a policy . . . expected to produce a widespread 
public benefit"). 
87. Lucas, 1 I2 S .  Ct. at 2899. 
88. Id. at 2897. 
89. Id. (quoting Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n. 483 U.S. 825.834 (1987)). 
90. See Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York. 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1068 (N.Y. 1989). 
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ance; and exploration of the extent and scope of Scalia's policy of no 
deference in Lucas. 
The cumulative effect of the much-anticipated cases of the 1991 
term, then, is the creation of additional questions for the courts and 
land use lawyers. The challenge of formulating practical strategies for 
proceeding through this judicial thicket is great indeed. This challenge 
is partially met through an examination of the operating techniques of 
judges facing regulatory taking claims. 
A. Judges, Case Law and Social Norms 
In 1928, Karl Llewellyn faced a similar challenge when he undertook 
to explain the American case law system to German students at the 
Leipzig Faculty of Law. He noted that, in our system: 
Legal uncertainties arise far more when nonlegal norms in a society 
are in conflict . . . . [Conflicts among interest groups] are fact 
situations that arise because the margins of growth keep shifting in 
real life, and for that very reason they shift the law's margins of 
growth too . . . . The critical case always involves a fact situation not 
from the stable core but from the growth zone of life waiting to be 
reg~lated.~'  
Six decades removed, these words help to explain the unsettled na- 
ture of takings law. We as a society have not resoIved the tension be- 
tween property and environmental rights. Controversies abound and 
many law suits contest the effects of land use  regulation^.^^ In this re- 
spect, the dispute between Mr. Lucas and the State of South Carolina 
is a tremor running along a deep fault line in American society. Mr. 
- -  pp - -- 
91. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 99 (Paul Gewirtz ed. & Mi- 
chael Ansaldi trans., 1989). 
92. See, e.g.. Keith Schneider, Environment Laws Face Stiff Test from Landowners, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 20, 1992, at I (referring to over 200 cases of this type pending before the U.S. Court 
of Claims and characterizing the growing resistance to environmental regulation as a "move- 
ment"); see also The Private Property Rights Act of 1991, S. 50, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
This proposed legislation is evidence of the rigorous efforts of property rights groups in the legis- 
lative arena. If enacted, the measure would require federal agencies to conduct a "Takings Impact 
Analysis." that is, an assessment of whether proposed regulations might result in a taking of 
private property, and to  avoid such an effect, where possible. Parallel bills have been sponsored in 
the ' ~ o u s e  as well. See Private Property Rights Act of 1991, H.R. 905, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1991); Private Property Rights Act of 1991, H.R. 1572, lO2d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); see also 
infra note 286 (listing similar pending state legislation). See generally Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 
Fed. Reg. 8859 (1988). 
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Lucas himself is celebrated by a growing property rights movement. 
Meanwhile, national environmental and preservation interests 
staunchly defended the regulation of Lucas' land before the U.S. Su- 
preme Court.93 
How far property rights can be regulated to protect the public inter- 
est is unsettled and so, Llewellyn explains, must be the law. In these 
growth areas of society and its law, Llewellyn urges us to anticipate 
sensible outcomes in cases and to trust that the rules of the cases will 
mesh well with the inherent reasons expressed in the opinions of courts 
deciding such contro~ersies.~~ Outcomes in cases are "reasonably re- 
ckonable. "95 
1. Fact-Guided Decisions 
The key to such right reckoning, according to Llewellyn, is objective 
inquiry into the facts of the case at bar. The maxim ex facto jus oritur 
reminds us that the law arises out of facts. Llewellyn speaks of "[the] 
judges' insight into new fact situations and their meaning, being gener- 
ally referred to as the 'sense of justice' in the individual case."% He 
refers to this intuition as "fact-guided decision making."" 
Professor Frank Michelman similarly applied this perspecfive in ana- 
lyzing the trilogy of 1987 U.S. Supreme Court cases, two of which 
seemed to break from the historical hands-off approach of the Court 
regarding such controversies. He explained that the vulnerability of 
these cases to rule of law analysis is a "sign [ofl balancing-or, better, 
the judicial practice of situated j ~ d g m e n t . " ~ ~  Llewellyn also explained 
the phenomenon of situated judgment. He referred to the lawyer's 
practice of "classifying facts for purposes of description and further 
93. David Kaplan & Bob Cohn, Pay Me, or Get Off My Land, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 9, 1992, at 
70. The conflict in social values was described as follows: 
Lucas's appeal is the flash point in a national clash pitting environmentalists and pres- 
ervationists against a grass-roots coalition of ranchers, miners, loggers and developers. 
It is a war of both spiritual principles and economic principal [sic] that is being fought 
before local regulators, federal agencies, Congress and the courts. But what the justices 
do is paramount: a decision may effectively gut a generation of land regulation, as well 
as 50 years of judicial acquiescence to it. 
Id.; see also Eugene Linden, Demanding Payment for Good Behavior, T w ,  Feb. 3, 1992, at 52. 
94. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 36-37 (1960). 
95. See id. at 17 (defining reckonability as "degrees of lessening uncertainty of outcome 
ranging from what . . . seems pure chance . . . [to what] is for human living 'safe"'). 
96. LLEWELLYN, supra note 91, at 79. 
97. Id. 
98. Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1629 (1987). Compare id. 
with LLEWELLYN, supra note 91, at 60. But see REGWMD WNTER MICHAEL DIM, JUWPRUDENCE 
459 (5th ed. 1985) (criticizing this notion as "too vague, being in every case the product of a 
shifting balance"). 
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use."99 Llewellyn found such classifying "a tacit precondition for han- 
dling any legal dispute."Io0 In Llewellyn's view, once attorneys and 
judges agree on how the facts are classified, the rules of law they select 
and their views of the outcome of the case become more predictable 
and ~nderstandable.'~' 
The discretion enjoyed by.courts in making situated judgments 
brings with it the imperative that they adequately weigh facts and cir- 
cumstances. If, as Llewellyn tell us, judges tend to classify the facts of 
a case in seeking the rule of law to apply, there is an implied condition 
that they fully consider the evidentiary record. A panel for the Elev- 
enth Circuit recently addressed this issue in Reahard v. Lee County,I0* 
when it reversed a magistrate's terse declaration that a regulation 
worked a taking of private property. The appeals court stated that 
"the factfinder must analyze, at the very least," questions surrounding 
the economic impact of the regulation and the owner's investment- 
backed  expectation^.^^^ 
In the field of regulatory takings, the frequent reference by appellate 
courts to  the fact intensive nature of their deliberations sharpens this 
perspective. Writing recently for a unanimous court, Justice O'Connor 
noted that "[s]uch forms of regulation are analyzed by engaging in the 
'essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries' necessary to determine whether a 
regulatory taking has occurred."104 It is the "particular circumstances" 
in each case that determine the outcome of such deliberations.lo5 
99. LLEWELLYN, supra note 91. at 53 (ernphxsis omitted). 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 53-54. Llewellyn admits that this process of selecting and classifying facts gives 
judges some leeway in determining which rules of law to use and, thereby, the outcome of cases at 
bar. "[Elach way of construing the facts will contain a degree of violence to either the fact situa- 
tion or the classifying category." Id. He hastens to observe that, despite this leeway, legal cer- 
tainty is derived from the pressure of the facts, working through the tradition bound, common 
"sense of justice" of the judges. so that we observe a majority. "despite all their differences over 
the law, nonetheless reaching the same conclusion from the same fact situation." Id. 
102. %8 F.2d 1131 (I lth Cir. 1992). 
103. Id. at 1136. 
104. Yee v. City of Exondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1529 (1992) (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United 
States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)); see also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 
2886, 2893 (1992) (noting that in all of these cases, the Court has "generally eschewed any 'set 
formula' for determining how far is too far, preferring to 'engagte] in . . . essentially ad hoc, 
factual inquiries"') (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 
(1978), quoting Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (I%Z)); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 
485 U.S. 1. 10 (1988); Hodel v. Irving. 481 U.S. 704,714 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n 
v. DeBenedictis. 480 U.S. 470.495 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 
U.S. 419, 426 (1982); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 650 11.15 
(1981); Reahard v. Lee County. %8 F.2d 1131 (11th Cir. 1992); Hendler v. United States, 952 
F.2d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Azul Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 948 F.2d 575, 579 
(9th Cir. 1991). withdrawn on other grounds, Nos. 90-55853,9@56066, 1992 WL 168953 (9th Cir. 
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2. No Set Formula 
Despite the Supreme Court's plain statement that there is no "set 
f ~ r m u l a " ' ~  for identifying a Fifth Amendment taking, the temptation 
to do so seems irresistible.Io7 The U.S. Supreme Court has only gone as 
far as to indicate that there are several factors that have particular sig- 
nificance. Justice O'Connor briefly summarized these factors in the 
opening paragraph of her decision in Yee: 
Most of our [takings] cases . . . fall within two distinct classes. 
Where the government authorizes a physical occupation of property 
. . . , the Takings Clause generally requires compensation. . . . But 
where the  government merely regulates the use of property, 
compensation is required only if considerations such as the purpose 
of the regulation or the extent to which it deprives the owner of the 
economic use of the property suggest that the regulation has unfairly 
singled out the property owner to bear a burden that should be borne 
by the public as a whole. . . . [Tlhe second [category] necessarily 
entails complex factual assessments of the purposes and economic 
effects of government actions.lo8 
B. Following the Trail of the Lucas Facts 
This faint trail in the regulatory case law jungle will be picked up in 
later sections of this article.Io9 An analysis of the debate between the 
majority and minority judges in the South Carolina Supreme Court 
July 23, 1992); McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 676 (9th Cir. 1991); Samaad v. 
City of Dallas, 940 F.2d 925, 938 (5th Cir. 1991); Ciampitti v. United States, 18 CI. Ct. 548, 557 
(1989); Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 797 F.2d 1493, 1497 (9th Cir. 1986). amended, 833 F.2d 
1270 (9th Cir. 1987); Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 752 F.2d 1554, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 
1985); MacLeod v. County of Santa Clara, 749 F.2d 541, 549 (9th Cir. 1984), ceri. denied, 472 
U.S. 1009 (1985); Gil v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency. 593 A.2d 1368, 1370 (Conn. 
1991). This case-by-case approach seems to be guided by an understanding that the determination 
of whether a law effects a taking requires a "weighing of private and public interests," Agins v. 
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980), and is ultimately a matter of "fairness and justice." 
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960). 
105. See United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155. 168 (1958); United States 
v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952). 
106. See, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (stating that "this Court, quite simply, has been 
unable to develop any set formula for determining when justice and fairness require that eco- 
nomic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government"); Kaiser Aetna, 444 
U.S. at 175; see also Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 21 CI. Ct. 161. 168 (1990) ("There is 
no fixed formula for determining when a regulation or its application denies an owner economi- 
cally viable use of its land and thereby results in a taking."). 
107. See supra note 26. 
108. Yee, 1 12 S. Ct. at 1526 (citations omitted); see also Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-28. 
109. See discussion infra part IV. 
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decision in Lucas1I0 illustrates the operating technique used by judges 
confronted with complex regulatory taking challenges. The approaches 
taken by each side in that case illustrate how judges decide cases gener- 
ally and demonstrate both the constraints under which they operate 
(the basis for expecting predictability in results) and the severaI Ieeways 
available to them (which options breed the much lamented murki- 
nes~).~I' 
The majority in the South Carolina Supreme Court case spent little 
time discussing the facts. It analyzed the Beachfront Management Act 
and concluded that "discouraging new construction in close proximity 
to the beach/dune area is necessary to prevent a great public harm."'I2 
The memory of recent hurricane damage highlighted the importance of 
the legislative objective of providing "a barrier and buffer from high 
tides, storm surge, hurricanes, and normal erosion."113 In this way, the 
court classified the facts of the case: the regulation merely prevents the 
landowners from using their property to cause public injury. 
Next, the majority took several steps within this classification to find 
and apply the law. It cited the Latin maxim "sic utere tuo ut alienum 
non l ~ e d a s . " ~ ~ ~  It referred to a recent U.S. Supreme Court opinion by 
Justice Stevens for the proposition that a regulation that prevents a 
nuisance-like use of one's property has taken nothing.I1* It cited several 
South Carolina cases for the proposition that no regulatory taking oc- 
curs when the regulation under attack prevents "a use seriously harm- 
ing the public,"116 Finally, the prevailing justices established their 
standard for reviewing the regulation in question. They prescribed a 
highly deferential standard: "This [clourt is likewise bound by these 
uncontested legislative findings." I i 7  
On its face, the majority opinion is difficult to contest. The facts are 
straightforward and fit into a neat and understandable category. The 
110. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991). rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 
2886 (1992). 
11 1. See LLEWELLYN. supra note 91, at 53-56,7678. 
112. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 898. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 899. The phrase translates as: "Use your own property in such manner as not to 
injure that of another." See infm note 243. 
115. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 899 (S.C. 1991) (citing Key- 
stone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,491 n.20 (1987) ("[Slince no individ- 
ual has a right to use his property so as to create a nuisance or otherwise harm others, the State 
has not 'taken' anything when it asserts its power to enjoin the nuisance-like activity.")), rev'd, 
112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
116. Id. (citing Carter v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 314 S.E.2d 327 (S.C. 1984); Ri- 
chards v. City of Columbia, 88 S.E.2d 683 (S.C. 1955); Arnold v. City of Spartanburg, 23 S.E.2d 
735 (S.C. 1943)). 
117. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 898. 
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rules of law that apply to this category seem familiar and just. In a 
context of great potential harm to the public, a highly deferential stan- 
dard of review rings true. 
The dissent followed a similar track, yet arrived at an altogether dif- 
ferent destination. It too spent little time on the facts, claiming that the 
regulation reduced the lot values to zero.Il8 It cited a fundamental 
proposition violated by the regulation: an individual should not "bear 
a burden which in fairness should be borne by all."'19 When the regu- 
lation shifts the burden from the public to a private owner, a court 
may conclude that the Takings Clause is implicated. 
Based on this inherent sense of justice, it seems, the dissent placed 
the facts in an entirely different category. Justice Harwell stated that, 
in his opinion, the Beachfront Management Act did not have as its 
primary purpose the prevention of a nuisance.120 He opined that the 
activities the Act sought to prohibit "do not rise to such a level as to 
be fairly considered 'noxious."'121 The dissent saw the Act as an at- 
tempt to promote tourism, create needed natural habitats, and protect 
a place that harbors natural beauty. The fury of the hurricane was not 
paramount in its reckoning. 
The dissent concluded that the regulation intended to accomplish a 
laudable public benefit, the burdens of which should be borne by all. 
From this point of reference, the dissent searched for its dispositive 
rule of law. It discussed several U.S. Supreme Court cases and con- 
cluded that, in the non-nuisance prevention category of cases, the 
Court employs a two-pronged test: "We have held that land use regu- 
lation can effect a taking if it 'does not substantially advance legiti- 
mate state interests, . . . or denies an owner economically viable use of 
his land.'"Iz2 The minority easily found that the regulation violated the 
second prong. 
On its face, the dissenting opinion is also hard to contest. The facts 
are straightforward, and fit into a neat and understandable category. 
The rules of law applied to this category are familiar and just. Prece- 
dents are cited. In the context of a burdensome regulation that seeks 
laudable public benefits, the dissent would subject the regulation to a 
118. Id. at 907-08 (Harwell, J . ,  dissenting) (noting, however, that Lucas might be able to 
build on the lots under an amendment to the Act that allowed construction subject to the issuance 
of a special permit that had not been applied for). 
119. Id. at 906. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 905 (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 485 
(1987)). 
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review of whether it goes too far and thereby becomes a taking for 
which an owner must be compensated. 
IV. FOUR CATEGORIES OF TAKINGS CASES: SITUATED JUDGMENTS 
The debate between the majority and dissent in the South Carolina 
Supreme Court highlighted the lack of congruent social norms in tak- 
ings cases.lZ3 The majority read the act as an attempt to protect a criti- 
cal natural resource and prevent serious public injury. The dissent, 
sympathetic to the complete destruction of the land's market value, 
saw instead a legislature promoting tourism and preserving natural 
habitats for wildlife. In this, "the most perplexing area of American 
land use law,"1x each side had at its disposal rules of law on which to 
rely in order to vindicate its sense of justice.125 
This debate illustrates two categories of "fact situations" available 
to judges in the regulatory takings field. The majority sensed that the 
legislature merely acted to prevent a great public harm and placed the 
case in a group of cases where the primary objective of the regulation 
was the prevention of public injury: the Public Injury category. The 
dissent believed that the legislature was regulating to secure laudable 
public benefits, short of preventing noxious or offensive uses of land: 
the Public Values category. 
The majority of the U.S. Supreme Court in Lucas placed these same 
facts in yet another category. Since the regulation took all economi- 
cally beneficial use, the "historical c o r n p a ~ t " ~ ~ ~  contained in the Tak- 
ings Clause may have been violated. Such fact patterns fit into an 
Undue Burden category of cases, so labeled because the Court con- 
cludes that one or more individual owners of property have been sin- 
gled out to bear a burden that should be shouldered by the public. 
These three categories cover those controversies that our society de- 
bates the most: the "growth area of the law," to use Llewellyn's 
term.lZ7 A more settled category of disputes involves regulations that 
adjust "'the benefits and burdens of economic life' . . . in a manner 
that secures an 'average reciprocity of advantage' to everyone con- 
cerned."lZ8 The perception is that such regulations fairly arbitrate the 
123. Compare id. at 895-902 with id. at 902-08. 
124. Id. at 903 (Harwell, J., dissenting) (quoting, Richard L. Settle, Regulatory Taking Doc- 
trine in Washington: Now You See It. Now You Don't, 12 U .  PUGET SOWD L. REV. 339 (1989)). 
125. See infra part V .  
126. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900 (1992). Undertaking a 
lengthy review of the history of the Takings Clause, Justice Blackmun noted that "[ilt is not clear 
from the Court's opinion where our 'historical compact' . . . comes from, but it does not appear 
to be history." Id. at 2914 (Blackmun, J . ,  dissenting). 
127. SeeL~~w~~~~~,supranote91,at99. 
128. Lucas, 112 S .  Ct. at 2894 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 
U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922)). 
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obligations and rights of citizenship and ownership. They can be 
placed in a fourth group of cases called the Arbitration category, a 
class that represents the "stable core"129 of regulatory takings law, 
about which there is less social conflict and confusion in the law. 
In Yee, Justice O'Connor identified two, not four, categories of reg- 
ulatory takings cases and described the Court's operating technique 
with respect to both.lm The first category involves government actions 
that invade the physical possession of property, denying the owner the 
historic and essential right to exclude others.13' When government 
usurps such fundamental property rights, Justice O'Connor indicated 
that "the Takings Clause generally requires ~ompensation."'~~ This 
language implies that when a fundamental right is abrogated and the 
Takings Clause is implicated, the Court will scrutinize the regulation 
carefully. In such a case, the Court will attempt to protect the rights 
guaranteed by the constitution where it senses a heightened risk of 
their violation. 
It is in the second category, "where the government merely regulates 
the use of property,"133 that the rules become murky. Since such cases 
constitute the vast majority of regulatory takings disputes,134 discerning 
the judicial approach in this area becomes critical. Here, we are ad- 
vised, the inquiry is guided by fairness and the result depends on the 
character of the regulation and the extent to which the owner has been 
deprived the economic use of the affected property. 
A. Arbitration Cases 
Zoning, which limits uses of land and prescribes dimensional limita- 
tions on development in discrete districts, constitutes much of the Ar- 
129. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 94, at 99. 
130. Yee v. City of Escondido. 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1526 (1992); see ako Penn Central, 438 U.S. 
at 124-28. 
131. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (noting 
that the right to exclude others "has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured 
strands in an owner's bundle of property rights"). "[Plroperty law has long protected an owner's 
expectation that he will be relatively undisturbed at least in the possession of his property." Id. at 
436. Relying on this language, New York's highest court found a New York City regulation fa- 
cially invalid because it substantially impaired three basic property rights: the right to possess, use, 
and dispose. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y. 1989). 
132. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1526. For an example of a physical invasion of this sort that is not 
compensable under the Takings Clause, see Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 
836 (1987). 
133. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1526. 
134. Cf. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 (1992) ("(Tlhe func- 
rional basis for permitting the government, by regulation, to affect property values without com- 
pensation . . . does not apply to the relatively rare situations where the government has deprived a 
landowner of all economically beneficial uses.") (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
Heinonline 8 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 23 19921993 
24 J.  LAND USE & ENVTL. L. [Vol. 8:l 
bitration category of cases, where property uses are regulated for the 
reciprocal advantage of everyone in the zoning district. All property 
owners are burdened and benefitted in roughly proportionate ways. 
Potential conflicts of property use and enjoyment are arbitrated by the 
regulation. A certain "reciprocity of advantage" inheres in such regu- 
lations; the burdened owner measurably benefits from similar burdens 
placed on others. 
Since the U.S. Supreme Court decided Village of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty C O . ' ~ ~  in 1926, it has reviewed challenges to regulations that ar- 
bitrate burdens and benefits among property owners giving great defer- 
ence to the regulator, striking down regulations rarely and only when 
the challenger can prove conclusively that the regulation in question 
bears "no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or 
general welfare."136 
It was in the context of an arbitration case that the Supreme Court 
articulated the test to determine whether regulations are takings.I3' In 
Agins, which involved a landowner's challenge to the city's zoning or- 
dinance, the Court framed a two-pronged test, drawing from two of its 
earlier cases. Zoning "effects a taking if the ordinance 'does not sub- 
stantially advance [a] legitimate state interest[]"38 or [if it] 'denies an 
owner economically viable use of his land."'13g 
The Supreme Court in Agins and Euclid articulated a standard set of 
considerations for courts reviewing takings challenges in the arbitra- 
tion context: 
1. On its face, is the "'justice and fairness' guaranteed by 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments" respected by the 
regulation? la 
2. The principal indicator of fairness is "in essence a 
determination that the public at large, rather than a single 
owner, must bear the burden."141 
135. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
136. Id. at 395; see id at 388 ("If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning pur- 
poses be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control."); see also supra 
notes 43-44. 
137. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
138. This first prong derives from Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928). 
139. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. The second prong derives from Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City 
of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978). 
140. Agins, 447 U.S. at 263 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124). 
141. Id. at 260; see also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2923 
(1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens characterizes this notion as follows: "Perhaps the 
most familiar application of this principle of generality arises in zoning cases. A diminution of 
value caused by a zoning regulation is far less likely to constitute a taking if it is part of a general 
and comprehensive iand use plan." Id. 
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3. An additional indicator of fairness appears where the 
regulation involves reciprocal benefits to the landowner and the 
public. 14* 
4. Since "no precise rule determines when property has been 
taken, the question necessarily requires a weighing of private 
and public interests,"143 particularly in close cases. 
5. The public "benefits must be considered along with any 
diminution in market value" of the affected property.'" 
6. Determinations of the legislature regarding the legitimacy 
of the public interest will be "clothed with a s trong 
presumption of constituti~nality."'~~ 
7. Implicit in this presumption is the allocation of the 
burden of proof on the challenger to prove its invalidity. This 
is particularly difficult with respect to the first prong due to the 
presumption. 
These rules, derived from seminal cases, demonstrate the operating 
methods adopted by a court working within the "stable core" of regu- 
latory takings law. The rules encourage deference to a legislature pur- 
suing a comprehensive plan for the municipality, meting out burdens 
on land owners generally for the overall benefit of the community. A 
court's sense of justice is not offended by a demonstrated diminution 
in value, the methods used, or the objectives pursued by the regulators. 
There is greater social conflict and therefore greater divergence 
among the decisions in the other groups of cases, where society's views 
are less settled. A review of illustrative cases in each of these groupings 
further demonstrates the judicial operating technique in the takings 
field and provides a practical basis for answering the questions faced 
by public regulators and property owners. 
142. Agins, 447 U.S. at 262. 
143. Id. at 260-61 (citations omitted). 
144. Id. at 262. 
145. See Curtiss-Wright v. East Hampton, 82 A.2d 551, 553 (N.Y. 1981) (citing five other 
New York cases). Early on, the U.S. Supreme Court held a similar view: 
If these reasons . . . do not demonstrate the wisdom . . . of those restrictions . . . at 
least, the reasons are sufficiently cogent to preclude us from saying, as it must be said 
before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly 
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, 
morals, or general welfare. 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); see also Agins, 447 U.S. at 261 
("The State of California has determined that . . . [open-space plans discourage unnecessary 
growth]. Such governmental purposes have long been recognized as legitimate."). 
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B. Undue Burden Cases 
The first category of takings cases referenced by Justice O'Connor 
in Yee146 arises "[wlhere the government authorizes a physical occupa- 
tion of property (or actually takes title)" by the regulation.I4' In Lucas, 
Scalia expanded the first class somewhat, noting that "[wle have . . . 
described at least two discrete categories of regulatory action as com- 
pensable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest ad- 
vanced" by the reg~1ation.l~~ The first of these includes "regulations 
that compel the property owner to suffer a physical 'invasion' of his 
property."149 The second involves a regulation that "denies all eco- 
nomically beneficial or productive useof land. "lsO 
To judges, regulations from this first category appear to take the 
"fundamental" property rights of an individual, or unduly burden a 
particular owner or group of owners in order to accomplish a govern- 
ment enterprise. The Takings Clause protects private property from 
such public intrusions unless just compensation is awarded.Is1 A regu- 
lation that imposes an undue burden is more likely a violation of the 
intent of the framers of the Fifth Amendment. It was their objective to 
146. Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992). 
147. Id. at 1526. 
148. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992). 
149. Id. 
150. Id. Scalia's confirmation of this is worded as follows: "[R]egulations that leave the 
owner of land without economically beneficial or productive options for its use . . . carry with 
them a heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public service 
under the guise of mitigating serious public harm." Id. at 2894-95. Scalia also found this expecta- 
tion rooted in his view of history: "[Wle think the notion . . . that title is somehow held subject 
to the 'implied limitation' that the State may subsequently eliminate all economically valuable use 
is inconsistent with the historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of 
our constitutional culture." Id. at 2900. Blackmun's dissent cautioned against such an expansive 
reading of history: 
But the conclusion that a regulation is not on its face a taking because it allows the 
landowner some economic use of property is a far cry from the proposition that denial 
of such use is sufficient to establish a taking claim regardless of any other considera- 
tion. The Court never has accepted the latter proposition. 
Id. at 291 1 n.11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original); see also id. at 2914 (noting that 
Court's "historical compact" is not based on history). 
151. E.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982). In 
Lorerto, the Court stated the limits of this first category: 
Our holding today is very narrow. We affirm the traditional rule that a permanent 
physical occupation of property is a taking. In such a case, the property owner enter- 
tains a historically rooted expectation of compensation, and the character of the inva- 
sion is qualitatively more intrusive than perhaps any other category of property 
regulation. We do  not, however, question the equally substantial authority upholding a 
State's broad power to impose appropriate restrictions upon an owner's use of his 
property. 
Id. 
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prevent government from singling out, or placing undue burdens on, 
individual property owners in the public interest.'52 
When a court senses that it is dealing with an undue burden case, its 
opinion focuses on the wrong to the property. Its sense of justice is 
offended. Predictably, the public policy pronouncements of the regula- 
tor enjoy less deference. The majority opinion in Lucas illustrated the 
categorically different method of proceeding, once a case is placed in 
the Undue Burden category. In such a case, "it is less realistic to in- 
dulge our usual assumption that the legislature is simply 'adjusting the 
benefits and burdens of economic life."'ls3 This follows because such 
regulations "carry with them a heightened risk that private property is 
being pressed into some form of public service."154 In these cases, the 
regulations "invite exceedingly close scrutiny under the Takings 
Clause."t55 The challenger enjoys this stricter judicial scrutiny of the 
regulation upon a showing that the regulation has "denie[d] him eco- 
nomically beneficial or productive use of land."I5'j Cases of this sort 
tend to fall into one of two sub-categories: invasion cases and funda- 
mental rights cases. 
I. Invasion Cases 
In 1871, in the case of Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal 
Co.,IS7 the Supreme Court entertained a petitioner's claim that a gov- 
ernment action effected a taking indirectly, through the invasion of his 
possessory interest, without a formal action in eminent domain. The 
State of Wisconsin authorized the construction of a dam that raised 
the level of an adjacent lake, flooded petitioner's property, and 
152. See Lures, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 
U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922)). This concept is 
a mirror-image reflection of the "reciprocity of advantage" principle found in the Arbitration 
category of cases. Recall that such regulations adjust "'the benefits and burdens of economic life' 
. . . in a manner that secures an 'average reciprocity of advantage' to everyone concerned." Id. 
Regulations that fit in the Undue Burden category often violate the principle of generality that 
Justice Stevens says is "well-rooted in our broader understandings of the Constitution as designed 
in part to control the 'mischiefs of faction."' Id. at 2923 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 43 
(James Madison) (G.  Wills ed., 1982)). 
153. Id. at 2894. 
154. Id. at 2895. 
155. Id. at 2895 n.8; see also id. at 2893 ("In general (at least with regard to permanent 
invasions), no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public purpose 
behind it, we have required compensation."). Where such use is denied, "the legislature's recita- 
tion of a noxious-use justification cannot be the basis for departing from our categorical rule that 
total regulatory takings must be compensated." Id. at 2899. 
156. Id. at 2893. 
157. 80U.S. 166(1871). 
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"worked an almost complete destruction of the value of the land."ls8 
The Court held that "[ilt would be a very curious and unsatisfactory 
result, if . . . it shall be held that if the government refrains from the 
absolute conversion of real property to the uses of the public it can 
destroy its value entirely . . . without making any compensation, be- 
cause . . . it is not taken for the public use."159 
In 1945, the Court found that the dramatic impact on property en- 
joyment of lowflying government airplanes was "as much an appropri- 
ation of the use of the land as a more conventional entry upon it," and 
therefore constituted a Fifth Amendment taking.160 The Court noted 
that such flights were a "direct invasion" of the owner's domain and 
that "it is the character of the invasion, not the amount of damage 
resulting from it, so long as the damage is substantial, that determines 
the question whether it is a taking."I6' Similarly, the Court found that 
a regulation imposing a public access requirement on a water channel 
owned by the developer of a marina community constituted a taking.I6* 
By 1982, &his area of case law had developed so far that a regulation 
allowing a third-party cable television company to affix a cable con- 
nection to a privately owned apartment building, occupying only one 
and one-half cubic feet of private property, likewise constituted an in- 
vasive taking.163 
In 1987, regulatory takings jurisprudence became confused by lan- 
guage in an opinion by Justice Scalia that seemed to heighten the de- 
gree of scrutiny afforded land use regulations. In Nollan v. California 
Coastal Cornrni~s ion,~~~ as a condition for granting a permit to build 
158. Id. at 177. 
159. Id. at 177-78 (emphasis added). 
160. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1945). 
161. Id. at  266 (quoting United States v. Cress. 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917)). There are at least 
two attributes of this invasion that define its "character" as a taking. First, the government's 
action was in the nature of a trespass on the possessory rights of the owner. The effect on the 
property owner was so great that the flights amounted to  the imposition of a servitude on the 
property, greatly affecting "ltlhe owner's right to possess and exploit the land-that is to say, his 
beneficial ownership of it." Id. at 262. Second, the government action complained of was a gov- 
ernmental enterprise: the operation of a military airport. The Takings Clause is implicated partic- 
ularly through the imposition of servitudes on private land incident to the operation of a public 
enterprise. The Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment was added to the Constitution 
to enable the government to  appropriate private property interests for such enterprises. 
162. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) ("In this case, we hold that 
the 'right to exclude,' so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls 
within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation.") (foot- 
note omitted). 
163. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 (1982). In Lucas, 
Justice Scalia noted this line of reasoning when he wrote: "no matter how minute the intrusion, 
and no matter how weighty the public purpose behind it, we have required compensation." Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992). 
164. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
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on beachfront property, the jurisdiction mandated that the property 
owner grant the public a lateral easement, running from the mean high 
tide line to an existing seawall on the property.165 The Nollans had ap- 
plied for a permit that would allow them to build a house larger than 
permitted.166 They contested the permit condition as a violation of their 
right to exclude others from their property. 
The Nollan decision, written by Justice Scalia, placed these facts 
squarely in the Undue Burden category: ,an invasion case. "Indeed, 
one of the principal uses of the eminent domain power is to assure that 
the government be able to require conveyance of just such interests, so 
long as it pays for them."167 In the Court's opinion, this was a classic 
eminent domain, or takings, issue.168 
Scalia referenced the Agins two-pronged test.169 Without discussing 
whether the condition denied the owners economical use of their land, 
he proceeded directly to an examination of whether it substantially ad- 
vanced legitimate state interests. The majority assumed, without decid- 
ing, the legitimacy of encouraging public beach access.170 It denied, 
however, that the condition substantially advanced that objective.I7' 
Much has been written about the confusion in the Nollan decision. 
Before examining its ambiguity, it is important to emphasize what is 
understandable about the decision. The Court simply did not disturb 
the judicial attitude regarding the legitimacy of public regulation 
across a broad range of interests. This was explicit in Scalia's language 
in Lucas: "Our cases . . . have made clear however that a broad range 
of governmental purposes and regulations satisfy these requirements 




168. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2923 (1992) (Stevens, I., 
dissenting). Stevens explained the Court's orientation in cases like Nollan differently: "[lln the 
case of so-called 'development exactions,' we have paid special attention to the risk that particular 
landowners might 'b[e] singled out to bear the burden' of a broader problem not of his own 
making." Id. (quoting Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825. 835 n.4 (1987)). 
169. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). The Agins test states that a 
regulation is constitutionally impermissible if it does not substantially advance legitimate state 
interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land. See supra notes 137-39 and ac- 
companying text. 
170. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835-36. 
171. Id. at 836-37. 
172. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. a t  2897. This assumption becomes a powerful and direct endorsement 
of the "full scope of the State's police power." Id. The majority in Lucas reminds us that "where 
[the] State 'reasonably conclude[s] that "the health, safety, morals, or  general welfare" would be 
promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land,' compensation need not accom- 
pany prohibition," confirming the Court's approach in Penn Central. Id. (quoting Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978)). 
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In focusing on the connection between the easement imposed and 
the public interest served, the Nollan majority is said by some to have 
adopted a stricter standard of judicial review of takings cases.173 Such a 
conclusion, however, is not altogether clear from the opinion. The 
Nollan opinion contrasts wording used in Agins to that used in Euclid, 
even though both belong to the Arbitration category of cases. In Eu- 
clid, the Court examined whether the regulation had a "substantial re- 
lation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."174 The 
Agins Court required a regulation to "substantially advance [a] legiti- 
mate state interest[]."175 Scalia, writing for the majority, used the dif- 
ferent wording in Agins to craft an "essential nexus" test.176 
Only anecdotal evidence suggests that Nollan adopted a stricter scru- 
tiny standard of review, applicable to regulatory takings cases outside 
the Undue Burden category. At most, Scalia used pointed and nonde- 
ferential language177 to review the California Coastal Commission's 
findings in N01lan.l~~ One can only infer a desire to use the essential 
nexus more broadly by resorting to Scalia's subsequent opinions.'79 
The ambiguity surrounding this issue is unfortunate. It may be seen by 
some lower courts as leave to review with stricter scrutiny the extent to 
173. See Nathaniel S. Lawrence, Means, Motives, and Takings: The N w  Test of Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission. 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 231, 242 (1988). 
174. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,395 (1926). 
175. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
176. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). Compare the language 
in Agins and Euclid with that written over 100 years ago in Mugler v. Kansas: 
If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the 
public morals, or  the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects, 
or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the 
courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the [C]onstitution. 
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,661 (1887). 
177. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 ("[TJhe lack of nexus between the condition and the original 
purpose of the building restriction converts that purpose to  something other than what it was."). 
178. Id. at 838. Scalia refuted the Commission's arguments: 
Rewriting the [Commission's] argument to  eliminate the play on  words makes clear that 
there is nothing to it. It is quite impossible t o  understand how a requirement that peo- 
ple already on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' property reduces 
any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new house. 
Id. 
179. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. I, 18-19 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). In Pennell, Justice Scalia would have entertained, as the majority did not, 
the plaintiffs contention that the regulation did not properly advance a legitimate state interest. 
In both Pennell and Yee v. City of Escondido, 1 12 S. Ct. 1522. 1533-34 (1992), the majority of 
the Court shows no inclination to engage in a substantive review of regulatory actions that have 
been challenged as takings. This was reinforced again during the 1991 term in Arkansas v. Okla- 
homa, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1059-60 (1992). See generally Stan Millan, Is Clean Water Only for Those 
at the Top?, 8 J. LAND USE & ENWL. LAW 235 (1992). 
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which a regulation furthers a legitimate state interest outside the undue 
burden class of cases.180 
It is noteworthy, however, that Scalia's opinion never used the 
words "heightened scrutiny" or "stricter scrutiny" to characterize the 
formulation of his standard. Indeed, the only reference in the opinion 
to the Takings Clause appeared obliquely in the footnotes.1s1 Further, 
Scalia seemed to confuse due process and equal protection cases, and 
the tests adopted in those contexts, with takings cases and their stan- 
dards.Is2 Finally, there was no indication in his opinion that the Court 
overruled cases like Euclid and Agins, or the deferential standards they 
employ. 
In articulating his test, Scalia used wording that belied its characteri- 
zation as a new standard of judicial review, the so-called heightened 
scrutiny standard.Is3 He wrote, quite unremarkably, that: "The evident 
constitutional propriety disappears, however, if the condition substi- 
tuted for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end advanced as 
the justification for the prohibition. When that essential nexus is elimi- 
nated . . . [the regulation falls]."184 In the Court's opinion, there was 
no relation at all between the condition imposed in Nollan and the 
public purpose to be achieved.lS5 In the end, it is the utter failure of the 
regulation to achieve its objective that doomed the permit condition in 
Nollan, not the Court's stricter scrutiny of the regulatory scheme.lS6 
180. See, e.g., Kayden, supra note 67, at  301. Kayden interprets Parranto Bros., Inc. v. City 
of New Brighton, 425 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), as applying stricter scrutiny to a 
rezoning matter because of Nollan. 
181. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-35, nn.3.4. 
182. See Kayden, supra note 67, a t  314-15. Kayden explored this confusion: 
Agins itself is a product of due process and equal protection cases. Agins cited Nec- 
tow-a due process, not a just compensation, case-as the exclusive source of its first 
prong, thereby mixing due process apples with just compensation oranges. . . . The 
connection is complete: As much as it may desire to construct an alternate genealogy, 
Nollan is a direct descendant of Euclid and its due process-equal protection standard, 
via Agins and Nectow. 
Id. 
183. See, e.g., Lawrence W. Andrea, Trespass at High Tide: The Supreme Court Gives 
Heightened Scrutiny to a Slate Imposed Easement Requirement, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 991, 101 1-20 
(1988). 
184. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (emphasis added). 
185. Id. at 838 ("[Wle find that this case does not meet even the most untailored stan- 
dards."). 
186. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1928). The Nectow Court uses a 
standard and method of review similar to that applied by the Nollan Court: 
We quite agree . . . that a court should not set aside the determination of public offi- 
cers . . . unless it is clear that their action "has no foundation in reason and is a mere 
arbitrary or irrational exercise of power having no substantial relation to the public 
health, the public morals, the public safety or the public welfare in its proper sense." 
Id. (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)). Applying this standard, the 
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The best way to understand what Scalia did in Nollan in articulating 
the essential nexus test is to look for his "situation sense."'s7 Scalia 
characterized the California permit condition as "an out-and-out plan 
of e~ to r t ion . " '~~  It imposed on the private owner the obligation to al- 
low third parties to invade his posse~sion. '~~ The majority feared that 
the Nollans were singled out to bear an undue public burden.'% In this 
context, the strong language and a longer look at the regulation be- 
comes understandable. The argument that the opinion created a new 
standard of judicial review applicable to all categories of reguIatory 
takings cases, however, finds no support in the opinion. More impor- 
tantly, such a view ignores the Court's repeated statement that there is 
"no set formula" for deciding regulatory takings cases, but that it re- 
lies on ad hoc, factual inquiries into the circumstances of each case.Ig1 
2. Fundamental Rights Cases 
It would be hard to conjure a set of facts further removed from 
those of an arbitration case, such as Agins, than those brought to the 
bench in Seawall Associates v. City of New Y ~ r k . ' ~ ~  In Agins, provi- 
sions contained in a comprehensive zoning ordinance reduced the num- 
ber of houses that could be built on the owner's parcel. In Seawall, 
under a local law applicable only to certain properties, the owners were 
required to maintain their single room occupancy buildings in habita- 
ble condition, to rehabilitate them when necessary, and to offer them 
for rent to bona fide tenants, as defined by the regulation. The pur- 
Nectow Court overturned the regulation in much the same manner as the majority overturned the 
permit condition in Nollon. 
187. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text. Scalia makes it clear that the unilateral 
imposition of a public easement on private property would constitute a compensable taking, per 
se, under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Nollan. 483 U.S. at 831-33. When such an 
easement is imposed in the context of an  application for a discretionary permit, however, there is 
no per se need for compensation. The "essential nexus" between the condition and the objective 
to be secured by it is understandable and reasonable. 
188. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Assocs. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H. 
1981)). It is this phrase, which questions and recharacterizes the regulators' motive, perhaps more 
than any other language in the opinion, that suggests that a higher level of judicial scrutiny is 
being used to review the condition. 
189. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831 ("We have repeatedly held that, as to property reserved by its 
owner for private use, 'the right to exclude [others is] "one of the most essential sticks in the 
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.""') (quoting Loretto v. Tele- 
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982)). 
190. Id. at 836 n.4 ("One of the principal purposes of the Takings Clause is 'to bar Govern- 
ment from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole."') (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 
49 (1960)). 
191. Seesupra note 104. 
192. 542 N.E.2d I059 (N.Y. 1989). 
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pose of the law was to preserve the stock of housing suitable to home- 
less individuals. Its effect was t o  prevent these owners from 
demolishing their buildings and constructing more valuable structures 
in their place. 
In the court's words, the regulation took away the owners' "quintes- 
sential rights to possess and exclude;"193 took their right to "use their 
properties as they see fit;"194 and "negatively affect[ed] the owners' 
right to dispose of their properties"195 for "any sums approaching their 
investments."'% In the court's opinion, the facts fell outside the ambit 
of arbitration cases. The regulation so severely trammelled fundamen- 
tal rights of property owners that a different judicial attitude could be 
anticipated. Llewellyn's notions help anticipate the outcome in Seawall 
once the facts are classified in this way. 
The court wasted little effort discussing deferential standards of re- 
view. The court did discuss, however, the rights to use, possess, and 
dispose of one's property, variously calling them the " t r ad i t i~na l , "~~~  
and "classical"199 rights of property. The court quickly 
concluded that, "[wlhere, as here, owners are forced to accept the oc- 
cupation of their properties by persons not already in residence, the 
resulting deprivation of rights in those properties is sufficient to consti- 
tute a physical taking for which compensation is required. 
The majority in Seawall sustained its conclusion by selecting rules of 
law from invasion cases, where private third parties were permitted ac- 
cess to a plaintiff's property. Most notably, the Court cited to Lor- 
etto ,201 PumpefIy,202 United States v. CausbyYzo3 and Kaiser. 204 Quoting 
Loretto, the New York court noted that, "[tlhis right to exclude 'has 
traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in an 
owner's bundle of property rights."'205 
193. Id. at 1065 n.5. 
194. Id. at 1066. 
195. Id. 
1%. Id. 
197. Id. at 1063. 
198. Id. at 1062. 
199. Id. at 1063. 
200. Id. at 1063. As if to demonstrate the elasticity of the subcategories of undue burden 
cases, the court characterized the facts as constituting an "enterprise" case, a "fundamental 
rights" case, and an "invasion" case. Id. at 1065, 1070; see also supra note 161. 
201. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
202. Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871). 
203. 328 U.S. 256 (1946); see also United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 750-51 (1947) 
(unintentional flooding). 
204. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
205. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1063 (N.Y. 1989) (quoting Lor- 
etto, 458 U.S. at 435). 
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Having disposed of the local law as a deprivation of fundamental 
property rights, a "per se taking," the court also considered whether it 
was a "regulatory taking." For this purpose, it used the traditional 
Agins two-pronged test. In applying the test, however, the court used 
language unfamiliar to those accustomed to reading arbitration case 
decisions. First, the court took the case out of the arbitration class: 
[Tlhe constitutional guarantee against uncompensated takings is 
violated when the adjustment of rights for the public good becomes 
so disproportionate that it can be said that the governmental action is 
"forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."206 
As a regulatory takings case, this analysis ventured into the Undue 
Burden category, where the reciprocity of advantage present in arbitra- 
tion cases is absent. 
Second, the court held that the taking of a "discrete twig out of (the 
owner's) fee simple bundle of can effectively deny an owner 
economical use of his property. This, in itself, fails the second prong 
of the Agins test.208 The Seawall opinion therefore dramatically con- 
trasts with the proof required of challengers in arbitration cases wher~  
land owners must show conclusively that the property has no reasona- 
ble use. The Seawall court did not discuss the economic impact of the 
regulation. Instead, it grafted its fundamental rights violation argu- 
ments into the second prong of the Agins test and concluded that it "is 
inescapable that the effect of the provisions is unconstitutionally to de- 
prive owners of economically viable use of their properties."209 
Third, the court adopted "close nexus" and "heightened judicial 
scrutiny"210 standards, attributing them to Nollan. The court applied 
these strict standards to the first prong of the test: whether the regula- 
tion substantially advances a legitimate state interest. The court never 
questioned the appropriateness of the public objective of housing the 
homeless. Instead, it doubted that the law advanced the objective, not- 
ing that the city's own study acknowledged that the preservation of 
such units "would do little to resolve the homeless ~risis."~" 
Fourth, it appears that the majority reversed the burden of proof 
employed in arbitration cases and the "fairly debatable" standard of 
206. Id. at 1065 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40.49 (1960)). 
207. Id. at 1067 (quoting Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on 
the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation " Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1 165, 1233 (1967)). 
208. Seesupra notes 137-39 and accompanying text. 
209. Seawall. 542 N.E.2dat 1068. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
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deference articulated by Euclid. The court noted that "[tlhe heavy ex- 
actions imposed by [the law] must 'substantially advance' its putative 
purpose of relieving h~melessness."~~~ The court did not find that the 
law met this "close nexus" requirement. 
The result of this New York decision is understandable as an undue 
burden case. Like the Lucas bench, the New York Court of Appeals 
sensed that it faced a case belonging to a "categor[y] of regulatory 
action" where compensation may be awarded "without case-specific 
inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint."213 
This view echoes Scalia's suggestion in Lucas that "there are plainly a 
number of noneconomic interests in land whose impairment will invite 
exceedingly close scrutiny under the Takings Clause."214 Primary 
among these noneconomic interests is the fundamental right to exclude 
others. As the court in Loretto noted, "[past] cases uniformly have 
found a taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to 
whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only 
minimal economic impact on the owner."215 
Does the Seawall decision make sense, however, if applied to other 
classes of takings cases? The state court referenced the owner's right to 
"use their properties as they see fit"216 as a fundamental right of prop- 
erty ownership. If Seawall is applied literally outside the undue burden 
context, zoning setback requirements, which clearly and substantially 
limit private property use, would become takings without regard to 
their economic impact or the public benefit achieved. The Seawall 
court clearly did not envision this result. This difficultly illustrates the 
importance of confining regulatory takings holdings to the factual situ- 
ation out of which they arise. Moreover, it suggests that the historic, 
deferential standards of review still apply outside the Undue Burdens 
category.217 
212. Id. at  1069. 
213. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,2893 (1992). 
214. Id. at 2895 n.3 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 
436 (1982). an invasion case). 
215. Loretto. 458 U.S. at 434-35. Compare id. with Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 
1522, 1530 (1992) (noting that a governmentally compelled physical occupation "may be relevant 
to  a regulatory taking argument, as it may be one factor a reviewing court would wish to  consider 
in determining whether the ordinance unjustly imposes a burden on the petitioners"). 
216. Seowall. 542 N.E.2d at 1066. 
217. See Birnbaum v. New York, 541 N.E.2d 23 (N.Y. 1989). This case was decided by the 
New York Court of Appeals one month prior to SeawaN. In Birnbaum, the private property 
owner was prevented from closing her nursing home by state regulation, during which time she 
incurred operating losses. The regulation prevented the owner from using her property as she saw 
fit; it arguably prevented her from disposing of it and compelled the continuation of the business. 
That this impact on fundamental property rights does not compel the court to  find a compensable 
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C. Public Values Cases 
In Yee v. City of Escondido, after discussing undue burden cases, 
Justice O'Connor defined a broad second class of regulatory takings 
cases "where the government merely regulates the use of property."218 
In this second category, which certainly includes the Arbitration cate- 
gory discussed above, further classification may be merited.219 It is in 
this second category that a takings determination "entails complex fac- 
tual assessments of the purposes and economic effects of government 
actions. ""O 
Some commentators attempt to divide this second group of cases 
' 
into discrete categories by suggesting that courts weigh the importance 
of the public objective to gauge the fundamental fairness of the regula- 
tory scheme."' Although debatable, this assertion does find support in 
some cases. In Agins, for example, the question of whether a regula- 
tion constituted a taking "requires a weighing of private and public 
interests."222 Further, the California Supreme Court upheld on remand 
a regulation in First English based on its measure of the importance of 
the public objective achieved compared with the degree of private bur- 
den."' The court alluded to  a hierarchy of interests served by the police 
power with preservation of life at the top and the pursuit of aesthetic 
values near the 
Scalia's opinions also reflect interestingly on the issue of whether 
there is a hierarchy of public interests in regulatory takings cases. In 
taking is apparent in Chief Justice Wachtler's opinion, which found that no taking occurred. In 
the context of a heavily regulated industry, the facts suggested to the court that the owner was not 
unfairly treated; indeed, she reasonably could have expected such a prohibition. The state regula- 
tory scheme was designed to provide and maintain a system of health care for the people of the 
area. This, added t o  her reasonable expectations, took the case out of the Undue Burden cate- 
gory. In this context, the same court that decided Seawall was deferential to the state regulatory 
scheme, did not scrutinize heavily the reasoning advanced by the state in favor of the regulation, 
and affirmed that a takings analysis generally requires an ad hoc, factual inquiry, citing Penn 
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
218. Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1526 (1992); see supra notes 130-34 and 
accompanying text. 
219. Yee, 112 S .  Ct. at 1526 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-25). Justice O'Connor 
writes that in this second category, "compensation is required only if considerations such as the 
purpose of the regulation or the extent to which it deprives the owner of the economic use suggest 
that the regulation has unfairly singled out the property owner to bear a burden that should be 
borne by the public as a whole." Id. 
220. Id. 
221. See Charles L. Siemon, Who Owns Cross Creek?, 5 J .  LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 323, 362 
(1990) ("It appears . . . that the willingness of the courts to find that a regulation has gone 'too 
far' declines as the importance of the purpose increases."). 
222. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,261 (1980). 
223. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893 
(Ct. App. 1989). cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990). 
224. Id. at 904. 
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Lucas, Scalia confirmed that "a broad range of governmental pur- 
poses and regulations," encompassing the "full scope of the State's 
police power," including objectives such as "historic preservation," 
constitute legitimate state interests.22s Yet, in Nollan, Scalia assumed 
without deciding that the Commission's interest in preserving the publ- 
ic's ability to see the beach constituted a legitimate state interest.226 If 
the visual, aesthetic and recreational interests promoted by the Com- 
mission's regulations were legitimate interests, equal in importance to 
all other public interests, why did Scalia take this approach? His reti- 
cence implies that some public interests may be different from others 
when they are weighed under Agins. 
On examination, a more ~omfortable22~ rationale explaining why 
courts use more caution in the Public Values category is found in the 
central focus of regulatory takings cases on whether an owner has been 
singled out unfairly.228 Determining when an owner has been singled 
out requires an examination of whether regulatory impacts are distrib- 
uted broadly or narrowly. Regulations that restrict the use of property 
for aesthetic or historic purposes tend to fall on a few owners and yet 
benefit the public in For this reason, regulations burdening 
relatively few owners may receive more extensive analysis.230 
When regulations burden a few in the interest of many, judges may 
engage in a lengthier analysis and consider a variety of additional fac- 
225. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2897 (1992) (citing Penn 
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125, 133-34 n.30 (1978); Nollan v. Califor- 
nia Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-35 (1987)). 
226. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835. 
227. The proposition that courts use varying levels of scrutiny to review the regulation's pur- 
pose is at odds with the deference uniformly paid by courts to  legislative determinations. It sug- 
gests that judges second guess the legitimacy of state interests, as determined by elected legislators. 
The cases suggest only that courts will review with particular care the means chosen to accomplish 
such interests, not the legitimacy of the interest itself. This "stricter scrutiny" is limited, almost 
exclusively, to cases where an undue burden on a particular owner is effected by the regulation. 
228. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2923 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
229. Local governments, historically, have developed three types of aesthetic regulations: ar- 
chitectural review regulation, controls on billboards and signs, and regulation of junkyards. By 
definition, a relatively few properties owners are burdened by such provisions in the interests of 
benefiting the public at large. 
230. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, I47 (1978) (Rehn- 
quist, J., dissenting) ("[New York City] imposed a substantial cost on less than one-tenth of one 
percent of the buildings in New York City for the general benefit of all its people. It is exactly this 
imposition of general costs on a few individuals at which the 'taking' protection is directed."). 
Any doubt about the validity of such regulations should be resolved by Scalia's majority opinion 
in Lucas. Justice Scalia noted that the Supreme Court has regularly upheld regulations "on the 
ground that the restrictions were reasonably related to  the implementation of a policy-not unlike 
historic preservation-expected to produce a widespread public benefit and applicable to all simi- 
larly situated property." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897 (quoting Penn Central. 438 U.S. at 133-34 
11.30). 
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tors. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New Y ~ r k , ~ ~ '  for 
example, the Court looked to several matters to determine whether a 
taking occurred, including the character of the governmental action, its 
economic impact, and its interference with reasonable investment- 
backed expectations. The owner in Penn Central contested a historic 
district regulation that imposed a limitation on the owner's ability to 
build in its air rights.232 Effectively, the owner was denied a permit to 
construct a fifty-five story office tower over Grand Central Station in 
New York City. The Court adopted a multifactor balancing approach 
in affirming the regulation.233 In the process, it: 
1. exhibited sensitivity to the laws in "all 50 States and over 
500 m ~ n i c i p a l i t i e s " ~ ~ ~  that require or encourage historic 
preservation; 
2. noted the comprehensiveness of the New York City 
ordinance; 
3. found no onerous requirements in the regulation; 
4. concentrated on a transfer of development rights feature 
designed to provide some compensation for the limitation on 
development rights; and 
5. referenced "special mechanisms . . . to  ensure that 
designation does not cause economic hardship. "*" 
Citing familiar case law,236 the U.S. Supreme Court found that the 
law embodied the requisite reciprocity of advantage because of the 
comprehensive nature of of the New York City historic preservation 
program. Justice Brennan's decision is replete with deference to the 
New York State Legislature, the New York City Council, the Land- 
marks Preservation Commission, and the decisions of the New York 
trial and appellate courts. Although the lengthy analysis considered 
several factors, the Court, in the end, sensed that the principle of gen- 
erality was not violated and the results were fundamentally fair.237 
231. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
232. Id. at 109. 
233. Id. at 124. 
234. Id. at 106. 
235. Id. at 112. 
236. Id. at  I23 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960)). 
237. Compare Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 104 with Department of Natural Resources v. Indi- 
ana Coal Council, 542 N.E.2d 1000, 1002 (Ind. 1989). In Indiana Coal Council, the court de- 
ferred to  a regulation designed to prevent "damage to important historic, cultural, scientific, and 
esthetic values and natural systems." Id. at 1002. It declined to find that the prohibition of strip 
mining, to prevent damage to such values, was a taking. Indiana Coal Council, 542 N.E.2d at 
1004. The court imposed a heavy burden of proof on the challenger. Id. at 1003. The court de- 
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Contrast this to United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Phila- 
d e l ~ h i a , ~ ~ ~  where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the City 
of Philadelphia's Historic Preservation law violated the state constitu- 
tion's analogue to the Takings Clause. The Court saw in the regulation 
the degree of private burden that the Seawall majority found in the 
New York City's scheme to preserve residential buildings for the home- 
less. The Pennsylvania law gave the Historic Commission 
almost absolute control over the property, including the physical 
details and the uses to which it could be put. Further, the historic 
designation imposed upon the owner an affirmative duty to preserve 
the building, at the exclusive expense of the owner, in the . . . style 
and appearance mandated by the C o r n m i s s i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  
The tone of the decision made it clear that the Court sensed that it 
faced a reguiation that simply had gone too far. This decision was in- 
fluenced by: 
1. the numerous procedural steps, some of them costly to 
the owner, required for a permit to alter or demolish a 
designated building; 
2. the minimal repairs that an owner could make without a 
permit; 
3. the duty to preserve the building in its historic state; 
4. the imposition of criminal penalties for noncompliance; 
and 
5. the extensive controls over interior space. 
The exasperation of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is palpable in 
its reference to a comment by counsel for the plaintiff, undisputed by 
the Commission, that "the owner would be legally obligated to obtain 
permission from the Commission to move a mirror from one wall to 
another."240 In these observations, one senses a court classifying facts 
that will place the case beyond the reach of the Arbitration category. It 
should be no surprise, therefore, that the court found an absence of 
clined to use heightened scrutiny. doubting that the Nollan court articulated such a standard and 
confining its use, if it exists, to cases where the government requires an "actual conveyance of 
property [as] a condition of the lifting of a land use restriction." Id. at 1005. The court found 
that no intrusion amounting to an actual conveyance was involved and that the regulation sur- 
vived the "substantial relationship" test. See generally id. at 1005 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)). 
238. 595 A.2d 6, 13-14 (Pa. 1991), reh'ggranred, id. 
239. Id. at 11. 
240. Id. 
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reciprocity of advantage in the Philadelphia law: "Here, Philadelphia 
. . . is forcing the owner of that property to  bear a public burden, 
ostensibly to enhance the quality of life of the public as a whole. . . . 
This is a burden that, in fairness and justice, should be borne by 
a11."24! 
In this context, where the private burden becomes too great, the 
Court used a less deferential standard: "If after investigating there is 
doubt as to whether the statute is enacted for a recognized police ob- 
ject, or if, conceding its purpose, its exercise goes too far, it then be- 
comes the judicial duty [to] . . . declare the given exercise of the police 
power invalid."242 The court thus held the law unconstitutional insofar 
as it authorized the historic designation of private property without the 
consent of the owner. 
The different outcomes in these two cases, both involving historic 
preservation ordinances, demonstrate the importance of the facts of 
each controversy. Both Courts engaged in relatively lengthy analyses of 
the regulations and the burdens they impose. In Penn Central, the 
facts led the U.S. Supreme Court to conclude that the burdens were 
not unreasonable. Its treatment of the regulation, albeit extensive, was 
ultimately deferential. In United Artist, the Pennsylvania court sensed 
a fundamental unfairness imposed by the Philadelphia ordinance. The 
Pennsylvania statute appeared more detailed and directive than its New 
York counterpart. With its sense of fairness offended, the court found 
a taking under Pennsylvania state law. 
D. Public Injury Prevention Cases 
When the purpose of land use regulations is to protect the public 
health or safety, they often impose burdens on a limited number of 
properties that exhibit the undesirable or offensive effect. In this re- 
spect, such regulations often resemble those enacted to protect public 
values, such as aesthetics, history or heritage. Regulations that prevent 
uses injurious to the public, however, are significantly different. When 
the intent to prevent public harm is clear and the potential for public 
injury inheres in the proscribed use of the regulated properties, courts 
are less likely to  question the regulators. The essential fairness is more 
apparent because the common law historically prevented uses of pri- 
vate property that injure the 
241. Id. at 11-12. 
242. Id. at 12 (quoting White's Appeal, 134 A. 409, 41 1 (1926)). 
243. Sic utere ruo ut alienurn non laedas, "[u]se your own property in such a manner as not to 
injure that of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1380 (6th ed. 1990); see also Munn v. Illinois, 
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There is no dispute that there is a "nuisance exception" to the appli- 
cation of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As 
recently as 1987, a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court upheld this 
principal in Keystone,244 where the exception was described as extend- 
ing to the prohibition of harmful uses of land that are "akin to a pub- 
lic nuisance,"245 " similar to [a] public n~isance[],"2~~ or "nuisance- 
like."247 In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged the govern- 
ment's "unquestioned authority" to forbid uses that injure others, but 
disagreed over how broadly the exception applied to exempt regula- 
tions from application of the Takings Clause.248 
The debate over the breadth of the nuisance exception defies easy 
resolution simply because the task of defining a nuisance is so difficult. 
Henry of Bracton, the first codifier and commentator on the Common 
Law of England, wrote that "nuisances are truly infinite."249 Black- 
stone agreed. He defined public nuisance as "a species of offenses 
against the public order and economical regimen of the state; being 
either the doing of a thing to the annoyance of all the king's subjects, 
or the neglecting to do a thing which the common good requires."250 
In L u ~ a s , ~ ~ '  the Court noted that the legitimacy of land use regula- 
tions does not rest on whether they prevent "harmful or noxious 
uses."252 Instead, the Court found that the power to regulate land is 
coterminous with the "full scope of the State's police power."253 Hav- 
ing eliminated any doubt about the breadth of legitimate state interests 
for regulating land use, the majority provided a new setting for the use 
of the nuisance exception. 
94 U.S. 113, 124 (1877) (stating that government may require "each citizen t o  so conduct himself, 
and so use his own property, as not unnecessarily to injure another"); Mugler v. Kansas,. 123 U.S. 
623, 665 (1887) (stating that long ago it was recognized that "all property in this country is held 
under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to  the community"). 
244. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). The majority 
interpreted a Pennsylvania statute that prevented surface subsidence by limiting the mining of coal 
in the support estate, below the surface, as a nuisance prevention statute. Id. at  474. The Court 
stated: "[Tlhe Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has acted to arrest what it perceives to be a signif- 
icant threat to the common welfare." Id. at 485. 
245. Id. at 488. 
246. Id. at 492. 
247. Id. at 491 n.20. 
248. Id. at 512. Rehnquist argued that the doctrine "is a narrow exception allowing the gov- 
ernment to  prevent 'a misuse or  illegal use."' Id. (quoting Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86 
(191 1)). 
249. HENRY DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND (Samuel E. Thorne 
trans., 1968). 
250. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *166-67 (spelling modernized). 
251. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
252. Id. at 2897. 
253. Id. 
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Recall that in Lucas the majority agreed that a regulation can take 
"all economically beneficial use of land," if the proscribed use could 
have been prohibited under "the State's law of . . . nuisance."254 On 
remand, the South Carolina courts must determine whether the "back- 
ground principles of [the State's] nuisance and property law"255 pre- 
vent Lucas from building permanent structures on his two beachfront 
lots. In most states, determining what constitutes a nuisance depends 
as much on ad hoc, factual inquiries as regulatory takings analysis. 
Both look to the circumstances of the case, the location of the prop- 
erty, and the insights of an evolving society. By adding this state law 
nuisance inquiry to the standards applicable to this narrow category of 
regulatory takings cases, Lucas gave courts a factor to interpret that is 
as vague and hard to apply as the "essential nexus" test in N ~ l l a n . ~ ~ ~  
In future regulatory takings cases, the inquiry as to whether a regu- 
lated use could have been enjoined under state nuisance law should be 
limited to "total takings"2s7 cases, where the regulation prohibits all 
economic or productive use of land. Since these cases constitute a tiny 
fraction of such disputes, one must question the relevance of the nui- 
sance exception to the resolution of the vast remainder of cases where 
some use of the challenger's property remains. 
A regulatory takings analysis essentially invites an inquiry into the 
fairness of the regulatory scheme. Upon proof that particular proper- 
ties are singled out for regulation because of the potentially injurious 
nature of the prohibited use, the fairness of the regulation becomes 
more obvious. In this context, as opposed to the total takings setting, 
courts are not likely to "weigh with nicetywzs8 whether the regulation 
prevents a common law nuisance, nor are they required to do so by the 
Lucas decision. The more the regulator shows that the regulation oper- 
ates to prevent a public injury, the more judges will sense its essential 
fairness and not classify the regulation as a compensable taking. In 
such situations, a court will be more likely to sense that a regulation 
imposes burdens fairly if it concludes that the primary purpose of the 
regulation is to eliminate an injurious use. Injurious uses could include 
nuisances, nuisance-like activities, or conduct akin to a nuisance. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court recently decided a case relevant to 
this analysis. In Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands Cornrnis~ion,~~~ a 
farm owner, relying on Nollan, challenged a commission regulation 
254. Id. at 2900. 
255. Id. at 2901-02. 
256. Seesupra notes 173-91 and accompanying text. 
257. SeeLucas, 112S.Ct.at2901. 
258. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272,280 (1928). 
259. 593 A.2d 251 (N.J. 1991). 
Heinonline 8 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 42 19921993 
19921 REGULA TOR Y TAKINGS 43 
limiting development of his 217 acre farm to five homes, restricting the 
rest of the land to agricultural uses, and requiring a perpetual deed 
restriction on the property's use to that effect.260 The farm was located 
in the New Jersey Pine Barrens, an area of unique ecological fea- 
t u r e ~ . ~ '  
The clash of interests in this case, placing it in the growth area of the 
was as dramatic as the conflict in Lucas. The plaintiff's land 
was located in one of the most rapidly developing areas in the country, 
situated near "the midpoint of the emerging megalopolis that extends 
from Boston to R i ~ h m o n d . " ~ ~  The Pine Barrens contained numerous 
endangered plant and animal species. The lands also overlaid an aqui- 
fer constituting one of the largest unused sources of pure water in the 
world. The fragile ecology of the area also made it the first natural 
resource area protected by the Natural Reserve Program created by the 
U.S. C ~ n g r e s s . ~  Federal and state legislation created a planning com- 
mission for the Pinelands. Using its zoning powers, the commission 
adopted a comprehensive management plan and land use regulations, 
including those which restricted the plaintiff's parcel. 
The operating technique of the court in reviewing the plaintiff's tak- 
ing challenge is instructive. First, it referenced the Arbitration category 
of cases, calling the commission's regulatory scheme "fundamentally a 
regime of zoning."26s The court noted that regulations from the Arbi- 
tration category must meet the demands of the two-pronged Agins 
test.266 The court stated, however, that when the impacts of a regula- 
tion amount to "particularized restrictions on property with special 
 characteristic^,"^^ the judicial demands of the legislation "become 
more elaborateMM8 and require an analysis of several factors.269 
260. Id. at 253, 256.258-59. 
261. Id. at 253. 
262. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 91. 
263. Gardner. 593 A.2d at 254. 
264. National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-625, 92 Stat. 3492 (codified 
as amended at 16 U.S.C. 8 471i (1988)). 
265. Gardner, 593 A.2d at 257. 
266. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). A zoning scheme "must substan- 
tially advance legitimate state interests, and it cannot deny an owner all economically viable use of 
the land." Gardner, 593 A.M at 257. 
267. Gardner, 593 A.M at 256. 
268. Id. at 257; see ako Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987) 
("We are inclined to be particularly carqful about the [term 'substantial'] where the actual con- 
veyance of property is [required], . . . since in that context there is heightened risk that the pur- 
pose is avoidance of the compensation requirement.") (emphasis added). 
269. Gardner, 593 A.2d at 257 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 
loll, 124-28 (1978)). 
Heinonline 8 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 43 19921993 
44 J.  LAND USE & ENVTL. L. [Vol. 8:l 
Because the challenged regulatory regime involved particularized res- 
trictions on property with special characteristics, the court engaged in a 
lengthy analysis of whether it furthered legitimate state interests or de- 
nied the plaintiff all economically viable use of his land. In undertak- 
ing this analysis, the court began with its observation that the 
legislation "advances a valid public purpose by preventing or reducing 
harm to the public."270 The court reached this conclusion without ref- 
erence to common law nuisance principles. 
The court cited a New Jersey precedent for the proposition that "[a] 
property owner 'has no absolute and unlimited right to change the es- 
sential natural character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for 
which it was unsuited in its natural state and which injures the rights of 
others."'27' Without referencing the "essential nexus" test, the court 
disposed of the plaintiff's Nollan challenge by finding that the regula- 
tion "does not constitute a burden that is unrelated to the essential 
purposes of the regulatory scheme."272 Finally, the court concluded 
that, by allowing the existing agricultural uses to continue and permit- 
ting the development of five houses, the owner could enjoy gainful use 
of the property and that there was "no showing that the economic im- 
pact of the regulations interfere[d] with distinct investment-backed ex- 
pectations. "273 
The decision, though lengthy and careful in its analysis, deferred to 
the regulator and imposed a burden on the challenger to prove that the 
regulation violated the Agins test. In the public injury or arbitration 
context - both referenced in Gardner - this is the classic and time- 
honored approach of the judiciary. 
Recognizing the different categories of takings claims helps one un- 
derstand how judges use their discretion to resolve disputes. Under- 
standing the operating techniques may assist regulators in designing 
legislation that will resist judicial scrutiny. This section suggests meth- 
ods by which regulators may apply the foregoing discussion of the var- 
270. Id. at 258. 
271. Id. (quoting Usdin v. Environmental Protection Dep't, 414 A.2d 280, 288 (Law Div. 
1980). afyd, 430 A.M 949 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981)). 
272. Id. at 259. The court noted that the Pine Barrens deed restriction requirement imposed a 
use restriction, similar to a zoning restriction, not a physical access easement or invasion as found 
in NoNan. In this context, it applied the standard test of whether the "development limitations 
substantially advanced legitimate state interests." Id. (citing Glisson v. Alachua County, 558 So. 
2d 1030 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)). 
273. Id.at26l. 
Heinonline 8 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 44 19921993 
1992) REGULA TORY TAKINGS 45 
ious takings categories and create fair, equitable, and above all 
constitutional regulations. 
A. Judicial Leeways and Constraints 
The flexibility retained by judges in this field leads to considerable 
frustration on the part of regulators and property owners alike. In Lu- 
cas, the majority of the state supreme court sustained the regulation as 
preventing public injury, conferring special status on "this kind of reg- 
ulation" using common law terms: "no individual has a right to use 
his property so as to create a nuisance or otherwise harm others."274 
The dissent characterized the same regulation as a public values case, 
one that merely promoted tourism and therefore should not withstand 
Fifth Amendment analysis.27s The U.S. Supreme Court majority opin- 
ion flatly labeled the facts as falling in the Undue Burden category 
where compensation must be awarded "without case-specific inquiry 
into the public interest advanced. "276 
Does Lucas teach us that regulators and property owners are subject 
to the whim of judges who simply decide cases according to their life 
experien~e?~" Llewellyn argued that judges are guided by constraining 
principles and techniques and have leeway in deciding cases, particu- 
larly where social values are in flux.278 He suggested that the facts lead 
judges to classify a dispute and that from such classifications they 
search for the applicable rules of law. In the regulatory taking field 
there are four types of fact patterns, classified as: Arbitration category 
cases,279 Undue Burden category  case^,^ Public Values category 
cases,281 and Public Injury category cases.B2 In these categories, there 
are some constraints on the judiciary and some leeways. 
274. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 404 S.E.2d 895, 898-99 (S.C. 1991) (citing 
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987)). rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 
2886 (1992). 
275. Id. at 906. 
276. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 112 S. Ct. 2886,2893 (1992). 
277. There is validity to the observation that reviewing courts have great discretion to define 
the issues and thereby predetermine the result. Seesupm note 101. This happened in Nollan where 
the U.S. Supreme Court focused on the weakest of several Coastal Commission justifications for 
the lateral easement-viewshed protection-and then proceeded to find no "essential nexus" be- 
tween the easement and that objective. The material that follows discusses both these leeways and 
the influences that constrain judicial discretion. These factors also help explain how discretion and 
constraints influence the way judges behave. Would, for example, the majority in Nollan have 
used its discretion to define the issues as it did if it had not been dealing with an undue burden 
case involving an invasion of the owner's possession? 
278. See supra notes 91-101 and accompanying text. 
279. See supm part 1V.A. 
280. See supra part 1V.B. 
281. See supra part 1V.C. 
282. See supra part 1V.D. 
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In certain ways, judges seem constrained. First, they are committed, 
in all four categories of cases, to search for fundamental fairness in the 
challenged regulation. Second, they make two demands of all regula- 
tions, following the Agins prescription: the regulation must substan- 
tially advance a legitimate public interest and must not take all 
economically viable use of the property from the owner.283 Third, 
judges very seldom question a legislative finding that a particular ob- 
jective is a legitimate subject justifying public regulation of private 
rights. Fourth, in determining whether the property owner is unfairly 
burdened, they will search for reciprocity of advantage and whether 
similar properties are treated in the same way. Finally, they will put the 
initial burden of proving the unconstitutionality of the regulation on 
the challenger. In the Undue Burden category this burden requires only 
that the owner show an invasion of the possession or that there has 
been a total taking. 
In other ways, judges enjoy Ieeways that they are more likely to use 
where they sense that relatively few owners have been singled out to 
bear a burden in the public interest. Since public benefit and public 
injury cases tend to involve particularized restrictions on properties 
with special characteristics, judges tend to proceed with greater care 
and to analyze, in more detail, whether these particular burdens are 
justified. The cases have not articulated the precise levels of judicial 
scrutiny applied in these cases. The court may engage in an ad hoc, 
factual inquiry of sufficient intensity to satisfy itself that the regulation 
is essentially fair. In such cases, the relationship between the regulatory 
objective and the means chosen to accomplish it may be examined 
more carefully. If judges find that the regulation prevents uses of 
property that are injurious to the public, the fairness of the regulation 
is more evident than when the regulation merely promotes public val- 
ues or sensibilities. In these latter cases, judges are more likely to en- 
gage in multi-factor balancing of the public and private interests 
affected by the reguIation. Nonetheless, judges are not constrained to 
use any particular set of factors, nor are they required to balance or 
weigh them in any preordained way. 
The sum of the U.S. Supreme Court regulatory takings case law is 
that the vast majority of regulations will be undisturbed by the courts, 
simply because judges are trained to defer to legislative determinations, 
absent a showing of essential unfairness which is absent in most cases. 
The much touted ambiguity of the case law and the use of stricter stan- 
dards arise in very unusual fact situations such as the total takings con- 
-- 
283. Agins v.  City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,260-61 (1980). 
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text, an invasion of possessory rights, or a rather obvious trammelling 
of fundamental rights. Generally, this ambiguity and these stricter 
rules apply only to similar fact patterns. 
B. Principle of Maximum Fairness 
The practical lesson to be learned from the foregoing analysis is that 
land use regulators should strive to achieve essential fairness rather 
than relax with the assumption that their regulations are presumed 
valid. For a variety of reasons, those who draft regulations should fol- 
low a principle of maximum fairness and engage themselves in the ex- 
ercises undertaken by the courts in close cases. The following 
principles should guide their inquiry: 
1. A regulatory regime that is generally fair might seem 
unduly burdensome as applied to a particular owner, triggering 
more careful judicial analysis, a takings finding, and public 
cost and embarrassment. 
2. Because judges do enjoy leeways in this field, and the 
rules in one category of cases can bleed through to other 
categories, there is no guarantee that a given set of facts will be 
placed in a particular category. 
3. By proceeding fairly in regulating land uses, situations 
that lead courts and commentators to use phrases like "out- 
and-out plan of extortion"2s4 and "predatory regulatory 
practices"285 can be avoided along with the perception that land 
use regulation, in general, has gone too far. Unless this 
happens, victories in the courtroom can be negated in 
legislative chambers. The Private Property Rights Act of 1991, 
pending in the  Senate  and  suppor ted by t he  Bush 
administration, would subject all federal regulations to a 
"takings impact analysis" that would constrain the issuance of 
needed and useful r egu la t i~ns .~  Such legislative proposals are 
284. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n. 483 U.S. 825.837 (1987). 
285. Bruce W. Burton, Predatory Municipl Zoning Practices: Changing the Presumption of 
Constitutionality in the Wake of the "Takings Trilogy" 44 A m .  L. REV. 65,92 (1991). 
286. The Private Property Rights Act of 1991. S. 50, ]OM. Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); see supra 
note 92. Bills requiring state agencies to conduct a takings impact analyses prior to the issuance of 
new regulations have been introduced in state legislatures in at least the following states: Ala- 
bama, see S. 84, Reg. Sess., 1992 Ala. Acts; Arizona, sw H.R. 2236, S. 1005, 40th Leg., 2d Sess., 
1992 Ariz. Sess. Laws; California, see A. 1557. Reg. Sess.. 1991 Cal. Stat. (applicable to Fish and 
Game Commission; died in committee); Delaware. see S. 130. 136th Leg.. Reg. Sess., 1991 Del. 
Laws; Kentucky, see H.R. 768, Reg. Sess., 1992 Ky. Acts; Maine, see S. 664, 115th Leg., 2d 
Sess., 1992 Me. Laws; Missouri, see H.R. 1721.86th Leg., 2d Sess., 1992 Mo. Laws; New Hamp- 
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less likely to succeed if there is no perceived need for their 
protections. 
4. Productive use of  land is respected by the law. 
Regulations that intrude on such uses only so far as necessary 
to accomplish their environmental or other public objective are 
less vulnerable to invalidation by judges trained to respect 
private rights as we11 as the discretion of legislatures. 
If regulators ignore this call for maximum fairness they run the risk 
of offending the sensibility of the court and having their determina- 
tions scrutinized more rigorously. Regulations designed to be fair are 
less likely to offend the court's "sense of justice." If a reviewing court 
senses a balanced regulation, it is less likely to conclude that the Tak- 
ings Clause is implicated, and will tend to adopt a deferential posture. 
I .  Supporting Justification 
Land use regulations not based on adequate findings to justify their 
private burdens will tend to throw judges back on their own sense of 
fairness. For this reason, regulations should always contain detailed 
findings of fact that support their adoption and impacts. As Justice 
Scalia counselled, however, this needs "to be more than an exercise in 
cleverness and irnaginati~n."~~' In justifying any regulation, or analyz- 
ing whether it is constitutional, there are several key questions: 
1 .  Legitimate Objective. Is the public objective pursued by 
the  regulatory scheme clearly stated and convincingly 
supported? 
2.  Nexus. Is the close connection between the regulatory 
means and the burdens imposed obvious on the face of the 
regulation? 
3. Reciprocity of Advantage. Is it possible to characterize 
the regulatory scheme as an arbitration matter? Are the 
burdens of the regulation shared by a relatively large number 
of property owners including all similarly situated owners? Are 
there any speciaI benefits from the reguIation that run to those 
shire, see H.R. 681, ISM Leg., Reg. Sess., 1991 N.H. Laws; New York, see A. 9110, 214th Leg., 
2d Sess., 1992 N.Y. Laws; Oklahoma, see H.R. 1495,43d Leg., 2d Sess., 1991 Okla. Sess. Laws; 
South Carolina, see S. 188, 1230 & 1254, 1991 S.C. Acts; Vermont, see P. 14, 61st Leg., 1st Sess., 
1992 Vt. Laws; Washington, see S. 5122, 5539 & 6201, 52d Leg., Reg. Sess., 1991 Wash. Laws. 
287. Nollon, 483 U.S. at  841 ("We view the Fifth Amendment's Property Clause to be more 
than a pleading requirement, and compliance with it to be more than an exercise in cleverness and 
imagination."); see also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2898 11.12 
(1992). Note that this precaution was articulated in Nollan, an undue burden case. 
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owners? If the regulation burdens a.relatively few owners, is 
there a convincing justification? 
4. Undue Burden. Does the regulation effect, directly or 
indirectly, an invasion of the owner's possessory rights? Is 
there any other alternative to accomplishing the regulatory end 
that does not involve an invasion? If the regulation effects a 
result that appears to constitute a traditional government 
enterprise,288 such as the preservation of open space, is there a 
convincing rationale for regulating rather than taking the 
property under eminent domain? Is there a possibility that the 
regulation will prevent all productive use of particular 
properties? If so, could such use be prevented under the state's 
nuisance law? Does the regulation have hardship exceptions to 
prevent total takings? If not, is their absence justified? 
C. Regulatory Takings and the Comprehensive Plan 
Judges will have fewer occasions to second guess regulators when it 
is obvious that considerable and comprehensive planning went into the 
structure of the regulatory program. This is illustrated in Gardner v. 
New Jersey Pinelands Cornmis~ ion ,~~~  where federal2g0 and s t a t e 1  legis- 
lation designed to protect the New Jersey Pine Barrens led to the crea- 
tion of a comprehensive scheme of regulation. The legislation 
addressed a considerable number of factors, despite its primary focus 
on the preservation of the fragile ecosystem. For example, the state 
authorized the designation of "protection areas" for the promotion of 
agriculture and "appropriate patterns of compatible residential, com- 
mercial, and industrial de~elopment ."~  The Pinelands Commission 
adopted land use regulations, based on and consistent with a compre- 
hensive management plan, subject to the approval of the Secretary of 
the Interior of the United States. In this regime, the legislature and its 
regulatory agency arbitrate a full range of public concerns and private 
interests .293 
In Gardner, the court quickly saw the analogy between this regula- 
tory approach and zoning: "Because the Pinelands scheme is funda- 
288. See supra note 161. 
289. 593 A.2d 251,257 (N.J. 1991). 
290. National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. O 471i (1988). 
291. The New Jersey Pinelands Protection Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. QQ 13:18A-1 to -29 (West 
1991). 
292. Gardner, 593 A.2d at 254-55. 
293. Id. at 255. 
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mentally a regime of zoning, takings doctrine dealing with zoning is 
particularly r e l e ~ a n t . " ~ ~  The court noted, as well, that the regulation 
had a particular impact on property with special characteristics. This 
placed the Pine Barren legislation in a category of "complex, special- 
purpose regulations"29s where the demands of the judicial takings anal- 
ysis may become more elaborate. The tone of the court's analysis in 
this dual context, however, remained respectful of the legislative deter- 
minations. 
Under the Pine Barrens program, the large-scale reciprocity of ad- 
vantage in the regulatory scheme inheres in the concern for economic 
as well as ecological interests, paralleling the breadth of concern of 
zoning itself. As Justice Stevens wrote in his dissent in Lucas, 
"[plerhaps the most familiar application of this principle of generality 
arises in zoning cases. A diminution in value caused by a zoning regu- 
lation is far less likely to constitute a taking if it is part of a general 
and comprehensive land-use plan. "296 
Public agencies adopt and enforce many land use regulations that 
are either parochial or narrow in their focus. Local governments tend 
to be parochial, limited in their concern to property and affairs within 
their geographical b o ~ n d a r i e s . ~  State and federal environmental regu- 
lations tend to focus narrowly on issues such as air quality, an estuary, 
an aquifer, specific wetlands, a scenic river, or a toxic waste site. When 
these regulations stray from public injury prevention, as the minority 
of the South Carolina Supreme Court found in Lucm, they risk invali- 
dation under takings scrutiny. This risk is abated, however, if they are 
part of a more comprehensive approach such as that found in Gard- 
ner. Judges more easily find that regulations carrying out the objec- 
tives of a comprehensive plan accord with the principle of generality, 
confer reciprocal advantages, fall into the arbitration' class, and merit 
the full deference of the reviewing court. 
With single-purpose regulations, emanating from state and federal 
agencies, and with parochial local regulations, it is less clear that the 
public interest is fully considered and that the regulatory scheme, in 
294. Id. at 257. 
295. Id. 
2%. L u w  v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2923 (1992) (Stevens, J . ,  
dissenting); see supra note 141. Luces is properly distinguished from Gardner by the fact that the 
Pine Barrens regulations left the owner some discrete and valuable uses, while the Beachfront 
Management Act in Lucm did not. This difference can be perceived in the structure of the legisla- 
tive scheme: the Beachfront Management Act is more narrowly focused on preserving the fragile 
ecosystem, while the Pine Barrens regulations, although preservation-minded, focused more 
broadly on allowing economic uses. while still preserving the ecosystem. 
297. See Golden v. Ramapo. 285 N.E.2d 291, 299 (N.Y. 1972) ("[C]ommunity autonomy in 
land use controls has come under increasing attack . . . because of its pronounced insularism."). 
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balance, bestows reciprocal benefits as broadly as possible. The lack of 
order in a system of uncoordinated regulations, some parochial, some 
narrow in focus, is itself burdensome. Developers often face multiple- 
agency reviews by different levels of government. Obviously, a com- 
prehensive and coordinated system of land use regulation furthers the 
essential fairness sought by courts in examining regulations. 
The relatively recent appearance of comprehensive state-wide land 
use legislation, coinciding with the quickening pace of regulatory tak- 
ings challenges, is intriguing.298 Such initiatives, often called growth 
management statutes, generally require that state and local regulations 
be tied to comprehensive land use plans. The plans articulate state- 
wide land use objectives and local plans must relate to or be consistent 
with those objectives. The plans place emphasis on need analysis, data 
gathering, and the integration of that information. Information is of- 
ten assembled at the regional level and regulations are tied to meeting 
regional needs. The plans that result tend to be comprehensive in sub- 
ject matter and geographical focus, truly arbitrating a broad range of 
public and private interests in a uniform fashion. These plans in turn 
justify specific land use regulations at the local level and guide the issu- 
ance of single-purpose regulations by state agencies. Ultimately, they 
coordinate the expenditure of local, state, and federal funds on capital 
infrastructure such as bridges, public transit, highways, and water and 
sewer systems. 
When a regulation, challenged as a taking, is carefully integrated 
into such a comprehensive system of land use regulation, the natural 
tendency of judges to defer to law makers will be reinforced greatly. If 
stricter scrutiny poses a threat to the potency of land use regulations, 
then comprehensive and intelligent legislation that adheres to the prin- 
ciple of maximum fairness will keep control where it historically has 
been. Absent a showing by a particular property owner of an egregious 
burden, judges and justices are more likely to behave as they did in 
Gardner, deferring in tone and substance to the rule of law as compe- 
tently expressed by the elected representatives of the people. 
298. See Symposium, Growth Management and the Environment in the 1990s. 24 Lou. L.A. 
L. REV. 905 (1991). At least the following states have adopted growth management statutes: nor- 
ida, see FLA. STAT. ANN. $8 163.3161-.3243 (West 1990 & Supp. 1992); Georgia, see GA. CODE 
ANN. ch. 36-70 (Michie Supp. 1992); Hawaii, see HAW. REV. STAT. ch. 13-205 (1985 & Supp. 
1991); Kentucky, see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. $9 100.lll-.I97 (MichieIBobbs-Merrill 1982 & Supp. 
1990); Maine, see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, $8 4311-44 (West 1991); New Jersey, see N.J. 
STAT. ANN. $8 40:55D-1 to -112 (West Supp. 1990); Oregon, see OR. REV. STAT. ch. 197 (1991); 
Rhode Island, see R.I. GEN. LAWS ch. 45-22 (1991); Vermont, see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, $8 
4301-87 (1975 & Supp. 1991); Washington, see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. ch. 36.70A (West 1991 & 
Supp. 1992). 
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